Morgenbesser, Imperialism, Adam Smith, and the usefulness of philosophy
Sidney Morgenbesser (1921 – 2004) is best known in the profession for his witticisms and profundity (as well as a larger than life figure). Before listing his works, the Wikipedia page claims, “Morgenbesser published little.” This is also the impression I got from reading Robert Paul Wolff’s blog-memoirs back in the day. And indeed, he wrote, “Sidney published almost nothing in his life.”
Even so, I already knew that it would be more apt to say that relative to his outsized reputation, Morgenbesser’s work was relatively rarely cited (and perhaps went unread). I already knew it was false that Morgenbesser published very little (as one can verify on google.scholar.) because of my long standing interest in the philosophy of economics, I was familiar with a paper by him on Milton Friedman’s so-called F-Twist (also the subject of a more famous paper by one of his mentors, Ernest nagel), about which some other time more. And when I researched Laurie Paul’s work on Transformative Experience and Callard’s work on Aspiration, I encountered and read a rather influential co-authored paper by Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser, "Picking and choosing." Social research (1977).
Even so, I suspect that the breadth of his interests generated the impression he published little because he often wrote on topics that the emerging non-upper-west-side-pragmatist new analytic mainstream had little interest back then. And so it is true that those of us who came of age in the discipline without direct acquaintance would generally only learn about him through his quips.
Anyway, so much for set-up. I am toying with teaching a class on imperialism, and much to my surprise I encountered his (1973) “Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions” published in volume 3 Philosophy & Public Affairs. (I think this paper was also re-printed in the collection, Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs. edited by Virginia Held, Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel; Oxford University Press, 1974, but I don’t have access to it.) This paper is really very much worth reading; it’s as clear, incredibly erudite, and full of judicious and thoughtful commentary. If you have no time at all just read the opening set-piece in which Morgenbesser uses president Cleveland’s (rather surprising) criticism of the annexation of Hawaii to set up his argument. It’s also oddly relevant fueling my own suspicion that many of our debates resemble the unresolved ones of that turbulent period.
As an aside, for those with an interest in pre-Rawlsian ‘analytic’ political philosophy, Morgenbesser quotes quite a number of authors who are now largely forgotten. (He also discusses Rawls’ original position, in passing.) So, about that angle some other time more.
Anyway, part of the point of the piece is to give a kind of working definition of ‘imperialistic’ which is then subsequently modestly revised and developed in light of historical complications and possible objections. I quote the original presentation of this working definition to give you a flavor before I comment a bit. I should say, the paper reads much more fluently then this passage might suggest:
I suggest we think of S as "imperialistic" (a) if, but not only if, S is the center of an empire, where S is the center of an empire if there are separate areas, or regions, or states U which are ruled by S (in the degenerate case this may be a small and impoverished one), and S is not ready to abandon its dominion, but at best is prepared to promise eventual liberation when, as the saying goes, the colonized are ready for self-government; (b) S uses or is disposed to use force or coercion up to military force and coercion to try to assure that the dominion continues, or at any rate S has not renounced a policy of coercion either for the acquisition or maintenance of its dominion, although to be sure it may have acquired some of its areas without using coercion; (c) S will not continue its dominion unless S believes that the benefits to it from this dominion outweigh the losses. Some would add (d) the liberties, rights, and political powers of the citizens or inhabitants of the dependent areas are less than those of S. I am not sure about the necessity of (d), and it might be entailed by (a). I think it is more acceptable to add (d'), the dependent community does not have the ultimate authority about its rights and its privileges, or the ultimate authority about the rights and privileges of its citizens; if it has autonomy it has autonomy only in the areas that S allows.—pp. 11-12.
Now this working definition presupposes a distinction between an empire and being imperialistic because not all empires are imperialistic in this sense.
My interest today is in the relationship between a part of (a) and (c). For, that (recall (c)) “S will not continue its dominion unless S believes that the benefits to it from this dominion outweigh the losses” is already presupposed in (a), that is, “S is not ready to abandon its dominion” on a certain natural view of human motivation or agency.
It’s worth noting that Morgenbesser has no qualms about ascribing collective intentionality to political agents (like S). The methodological individualism so characteristic of, say, the philosophy of mind of the period and, subsequently, analytic Marxism was not the only default position of the age. The recent interest in collective intentionality (and social ontology) is itself a return to an earlier tradition. I return to that below.
In an accompanying footnote (15) Morgenbesser is explicit that the ‘benefit’ described here need not be purely economic or financial: “Condition (c) obtains even if the monetary costs outweigh the monetary benefits.” He then adds a rather surprising further sentence: “The entire discussion by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations is valuable. See pp. 523-625 of the Modern Library edition, or pp. 144-240 of the Arlington House edition!” This is a lot of material. For the aficionados, this starts with Smith’s chapter “Of Colonies” (Chapter 7 of book IV) through chapter 8 book IV. That is to say, Morgenbesser is recommending the heart of Smith’s treatment of mercantilism to his P&PA readership!
In the same footnote, Morgenbesser goes on to quotes one passage from this material in Wealth of Nations:
Now, what’s neat about Morgenbesser’s appeal to this passage is that Smith appeals to a collective sentiment — the pride of a nation — as at least a secondary explanatory factor. He also offers a primary explanation in terms of the “private interest of the governing part,” that is, in terms of social classes of a certain sort. But even here the explanation is not only material or economic/financial in character (viz. ‘trust’, ‘distinction’). So, Morgenbesser’s own analysis of (a) and (c) is at least, in part, very Smithian in character.
This can be illustrated by another footnote in which Morgenbesser confront’s Mill’s paternalist imperialism. Morgenbesser responds:
Notice that Morgenbesser takes such collective pride not just as something very real, but also as potentially morally very valuable. Of course, Smith himself had not quite encountered the Millian paternalist style imperialist yet (viz in (a) when “the colonized are ready for self-government”), so I don’t want to exaggerate Morgenbesser’s debt to Smith. [Morgenbesser quotes some of Mill’s imperial paternalism with evident disapproval a few footnotes down to illustrate this feature of (a).]
But something more important is lurking here. When Bentham’s anti-imperialist early unpublished writings were published in 1843, a key text was “A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace.” As I have argued (recall) that text is clearly structured around Smith’s arguments against mercantilism, and then uses Smithian themes to offer an implied, immanent criticism of the very passage that Morgenbesser has singled out! In fact, Bentham’s argument opposes public opinion to such national pride.
Now, I cannot prove today that Morgenbesser was familiar with this debate (although given the range of sources he has assimilated for the piece on Imperialism I would be amazed if he did not know so.) But I do think it’s clear he sides with Smith, and judges Bentham’s imperialism free world as too unrealistic. This can be inferred from the paragraph just before his official conclusion (about which some other time more):
I presume that the United States is still a dominant imperial power, if not the dominant imperial power. And it needs an ideology. Perhaps one could recommend that it should adopt the simple one of seeking justice. In practice, of course, no power will deny that it is seeking justice; but in practice, too, whenever justice and self-interest do not coincide, self-interest seems to win out. Perhaps the only thing we can expect is for societies to seek justice in their own domain and to treat each other in accordance with the law of nations. But at this moment no one knows how to ensure justice, economic growth, and the needs of military security in one country, much less universally. p. 43 (emphases in original)
Three quick observations: first, Smith’s proper art of government (as defended in the very chapters cited by Morgenbesser) is all about making self-interest and justice coincide. Second, the N-th best outcome Morgenbesser deems realistic — “the only thing we can expect is for societies to seek justice in their own domain and to treat each other in accordance with the law of nations” — follows explicitly from how he somewhat pessimistically expects people to respond to his re-interpretation of the original position: “one should perhaps ask, "What would I want done if I were to find myself in the least advantaged position in the least advantaged society?”” (p. 36) He doubts “that many of us would go quite that far; some might insist that the members of one society owe certain obligations to their fellow members first, since with their common interests and common burdens they deserve special consideration from each other.”
Third, we get an oblique window into what Morgenbesser thinks the task of the philosopher of a political even imperial community might constructively be: to provide it (even if tentatively) a workable and humane “ideology.” I mention this explicitly. For when he is not used as the exemplary source of oracular (but with Rabbinical yiddishkeit) source of wisdom or philosophical, quick wit, there has been a tendency to treat Morgenbesser as a saintly character in the collective memory being passed down. That may all be true. (His passionate opposition to the Vietnam war is well known.) But we would, thereby, be tempted to overlook Morgenbesser’s more worldly wisdom, and miss the affinity with the political aspirations of, say, Ernest Nagel’s pragmatism.