On the Neurath/Morris-Kallen debate over Orchestration and/or Unity of Scientific language
In How the cold war transformed philosophy of science (2005), George Reisch calls attention to a debate set off in 1939 (and published in as of yet hard to obtain 1940 paper), but primarily conducted in 1946 between Horace Kallen and the logical empiricists, especially Neurath. Before reading Reisch I only knew of Kallen (1882 – 1974) as one of the co-editors of The Bertrand Russell Case, but the Wikipedia entry suggests a very rich personal and intellectual life.
In his “introduction,” Reisch introduces Kallen early as the critic who treats “the Unity of Science movement itself as “totalitarian”” (pp. 14-15; see also p. 17, p. 19, p. 82). In fact, for Reisch the significance of this charge lies in the effects on the reputation of Neurath and the movement: “Horace Kallen’s denunciation of the project as “totalitarian” is explored to help explain both the “communistic” reputation the movement eventually received and Neurath’s eventual marginalization as a philosopher given to authoritarianism in both habit and doctrine.” (p. 24) And later, he claims that Kallen’s “politicized criticism of the movement” had caused it to be seen “seen as “communistic” (p. 188, where Reisch is partially quoting Morris’ judgment).
Reisch does not suggest these effects were Kallen’s intention, but it is also fair to say that Reisch has little sympathy for Kallen’s concerns. Eventually Reisch makes clear that Kallen’s grounds for concern are driven by looming threat of “the peacetime management of science along wartime modes of command and organization.” (p. 174) While it is surely too strong to claim that this particular concern was itself prophetic, it is sufficiently prescient in describing the ways democratic governments use funding to shape and organize science from the top down and for ends that are not always wholly pacific.
Interestingly enough, Reisch recognizes that Kallen’s description of the movement in terms of ‘orchestration’ was fruitful enough for it to be taken up by several of its members (see p. 38, and chapter 9). Reisch treats Kallen as a student of William James (p. 58), and later an anti-communist cold-war-warrior (p. 66& p. 82, p. 111)); but in his description (e.g., anti-demarcationism and “extreme…pluralism” (p. 174)) of some of Kallen’s philosophical sensibilities he makes him sound like an anticipation of Feyerabend (something unremarked upon by Reisch, although he describes Kallen’s views on science as ‘libertarian’ (p 315)).
Anyway, Reisch recognizes Kallen’s concerns over the development of unity of science precede the onset of the cold war. Reisch himself notes that Kallen’s motives for attacking the unity of science movement seem to stem from his own preference for and to impose what we now would call ‘multiculturalism’ as a new civic religion for America (the so-called “American Idea” (p. 187)).
I am myself a bit puzzled why Reisch is so unsympathetic to Kallen’s concerns with the risks inherent in the tendency of the movement, because he recognizes that they echo some of Neurath’s own criticisms, fairly or not, of the potential political effects of Carnapian semantics (p. 191ff),* and treats Frank as not wholly unsympathetic to Kallen’s views (p. 298). But I think that’s because he favors the possibility that “science (and, in turn, society) might benefit from a kind of collective, democratic planning among and across disciplines that was neither prescribed by nor expected to conform to any prior theory of science, society, or history.” (p. 323)
So much for set up.
Be that as it may, Reisch understands Neurath’s settled opinion on orchestration as follows:
The new Encyclopedia and the International Congresses, for example, would bring together specialists of different fields to formulate and attack problems that overlapped disciplines. Thus, Neurath proposed a universal jargon of science to facilitate this collective project and not – as Kallen insisted – to impose some body of theory on science from without. p. 238.
This project presupposes the diagnosis that the advanced division of cognitive labor, specialization in science, generates linguistic barriers of communication. Presumably the further thought is that differences in the content of each science can be overcome, in principle, by translating the particular/specialized scientific languages into the universal jargon. (And this is one reason why Quine’s arguments for or embrace of indeterminacy of translation is so threatening.)
We see this diagnosis articulated by Charles Morris (then at the center of the unity of science movement) in his contribution to the 1946 debate with Kallen in PPR. I quote:
Now, here the point of creating a language that can mediate among sciences is not to facilitate communication among specialist scientists (although they might benefit). After all, the specialists have little necessity to talk to different kind of specialists (and they may, as Peter Gallison noted years later, develop local pidgins). Rather, the prime benefit is to those outside looking into a specialist science.
In his argument, Morris himself emphasizes the utility of such a language as a kind of input to his own philosophical project, “a science of science.” Morris goes on to claim that the science of science is not meant to influence the future of the sciences, but to follow it (“A science of science imposes no limitations on science; it will follow its subject-matter as does any other science.” p. 510) And he himself suggests the significance of this to cosmology (echoing Huxley and Peirce’s ideas on synthetic philosophy).
Now Morris goes on to sketch his idea of the centrality of semiotics to a science of science. And this is truly fascinating, and worth returning to. But here I want to linger on Morris’ response to Kallen’s charge. For while defending his own project aptly, Morris kind of misses Kallen’s point, too.
Neurath and Morris both assume that the good intentions and explicit aims that motivate the construction of a universal jargon of science are sufficient to diffuse Kallen’s concern. (And so does Reisch, it seems.) But stated without hyperbole, one can recognize that Kallen is worried that creating a universal jargon of science may facilitate not just an instrument of Enlightenment, but also of undesirable top-down control of science. When outsiders can hear what music is being played they may well insist on turning down the volume or favor one kind over another.
As regular readers discern, I have some sympathy with Kallen’s worries. But at the same time, it’s also fair to say that the problems pertaining to mutual unfamiliarity and unintelligibility of the sciences also generate serious obstacles to tackling, say, novel and interdisciplinary externalities during pandemics or financial crises. They also impose increasing troubles for university governance and the use of scientific evidence in the law and journalism.
* In fact, Neurath was rather prophetic in realizing that neo-Thomists would use Carnap’s and Tarski’s semantics (p. 197).