In a recent podcast (here) with Alex Aragona of The Curious Task, I noted that those we might classify as ‘post-liberal’ are obsessed with elites and, in particular, replacing elites and/or replacing the ideas of elites. This obsession reflects the long-term impact of the Italian ‘elite’ school of political sociology (Pareto, Mosca Michels, etc.) as mediated by James Burnham (The Managerial Revolution; The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, etc.) on the contemporary Right’s discourse/analysis.
I don’t mean to imply that adherence to the elite school of political sociology is itself always disreputable: there is (recall here; and here) a Marxist discourse under the influence of, say, Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò’s recent work on Elite capture. There is also a more classical liberal discourse that appeals to elite capture to explain the status quo (see on Kukathas here).
During the pod-cast Alex did not ask me to follow up on the remark. But some recent blogging by Nathan Cofnas (Cambridge) — a self-described “philosopher on the right” —- illustrates the point nicely: on January 2 he published a post (here) called, “Why We Need to Talk about the Right’s Stupidity Problem “To win over the elites, the right needs to challenge the Big Lie that motivates wokism: the equality thesis;” on February 5th, he followed this with a post (here) “A Guide for the Hereditarian Revolution: How to win the elites and create a better world.”
Before I continue, I should alert the reader to the fact that, as I learned from DailyNous (here), one (or both) of these posts got Cofnas in trouble with his (private) funding agency. The case raises interested academic freedom questions, but I will skirt these here in what follows (at least today). In addition, I am not going to bother to argue against Cofnas’ claims about racial differences. My regular readers know that I embrace methodological analytic egalitarianism (MAE), which I tend to trace back to Hobbes, a view Cofnas would describe as ‘Woke.’
Also, I don’t mean to suggest elite political sociology is Cofnas’ only source from political philosophy; there is also a hint of Schmittianism lurking in the vicinity. (A symptom of Schmittianism is treating political opponents as enemies: e.g., “culture is influenced by ideas, and surrendering idea-generating institutions to the enemy is a bad strategy.” (Jan 2).)
Be that as it may, Cofnas uses the word ‘elite’ and its cognates around 50+ times divided over both posts. What might this obsession signify? The key point is that Cofnas assumes elites shape law (“relevant laws were established because the elites were already woke before the laws took effect;” “the underlying morality was already deeply rooted in the culture of their elites;” “the elites…at the end of the day, it’s their preferences that matter.” (Jan 2, emphasis added.)) So, the point is to change elite preferences in order to construct a better political world: “without hereditarianism, the fight against wokism is futile, and that a hereditarian revolution is both feasible and desirable. “Race realism” is the best term to describe the scientifically correct position. When the elites accept race realism, we can construct a better world.” (Feb 5.)
It’s quite noticeable to see a self-described philosopher “of the right” to embrace active social construction world-making. This seems to me characteristic of post-liberalism, which draws on many strategies familiar of the anti-liberal left while simultaneously rejecting wholesale social and human plasticity. (Mary Harrington, who is much less focused on race, also (recall) fits this combination of world-making while rejecting such plasticity.) Unlike past conservatives, Cofnas does not understand himself as a friend of existing authority or social hierarchy.
Now, in the course of his two blog posts Cofnas is explicitly committed to a philosophy-as-political-activism. (That need not be intrinsic to post-liberalism, perhaps, but with a few exceptions it seems quite common among them.) I quote from the January 2nd post, so that you get a sense of the program. I left out goals that I wasn’t sure he endorsed. (It’s not my job to give a full version of his program.)
“shame” right wingers generally “into living up to their intellectual potential;” (Jan 2)
correct right wing ideology because it fails to attract smart people; (Jan 2); or undo the “crushing intelligence advantage” of the contemporary left “over the right, especially among the elites.” (Jan 2)
to help “figure out how to turn smart people away from the left;” (Jan 2)
teach ‘the average conservative… why ideas are important;” (Jan 2.)
“Race realism needs to be incorporated into the right from the top;” (Jan 2)
Even the objectives that are by themselves noble (say, explaining why ideas are important) are treated in zero-sum terms (that’s the lurking Schmittianism). These are all non-trivial partisan, political aims. I don’t mean to suggest that Cofnas is only a political activist masquerading as a scholar. That is, his political activism is driven not so much by the preferences of contemporary political parties or their leaders, but rather by a wider set of views about ideology and the spread of ideas and he hopes to capture the interest of the movers and shapers/shakers behind political parties of the right. That is, he is what Julian Benda would call one of the clercs.
So, for example, Cofnas also claims to be interested in what we might call the ‘sociology of ideology.’ For example, he assumes that “the driving cause of wokism was widespread acceptance of the equality thesis,” and he goes on to note “that is what must be explained.” He considers “the equality thesis” the “Big Lie.” A variant thereof is that “If you assume that all human populations have literally the same distribution of innate ability, it follows that all group differences in outcome must be the result of environmental factors.” (Jan, 2).
Cofnas is explicitly and self-consciously a political scholarly-activist whose aim is to change the views of the elites and the (ahh) racial make up of the elites as well as the wider population. It’s possible that his obsession with so-called ‘race realism’ is merely strategic: for on his view, “Hereditarianism is the only idea that is powerful enough to actually make a difference.” But it is notable that the ends he advocates also involve racial demographics, or a “hereditarian revolution.” (Feb 5)
As an aside, in the January 2 piece, Cofnas treats Locke not just as the father of political liberalism; while drawing on the Essay 1.3.12, Cofnas treats Locke as the founder of the idea that “race differences are environmental;” and so for Cofnas Locke and Liberalism must be rejected. (Regular readers know I don’t think of Locke as a liberal.)
Now, in the February 5th piece, Cofnas distances himself from antisemitism and White nationalism (although he can hardly distance himself from what we may label ‘good-old racism’ since he treats it as a kind of scientific truth); this prophet of the long-term future (see below) explicitly aligns himself with Nietzschean views and against Christian morality (for “that wokism is simply what follows from taking the equality thesis of race and sex differences seriously, given a background of Christian morality”) , although the position he advocates sounds more Herderian:
Somewhat oddly, if preservation of racial distinctions were really the aim, it would follow from Cofnas’ position of race realism that endangered minorities or vulnerable racialized nations ought be given special protections in the social-Darwinian competition of the races. But that does not seem to be a conclusion he wishes to draw.
Now at one point, Cofnas notes that “The fact that race and race differences are real does not tell us what our ultimate values should be, or what kind of society we should strive for within the limits of what is possible.” (feb 5) So, one may wonder how far his world-making would go. The project really seems to be negative in character, that is, the overthrow of the perceived status quo:
Even if one were sympathetic to Cofnas’ race realism, this is just outright irresponsible. The status quo is hated so much that any “new equilibrium” will be assumed to be better than it. That’s a cultural revolution based on wishful thinking. In this sense, Cofnas is rather characteristic of many so-called post-liberals who are united in their loathing of the status quo without being able to offer a positive program. (I don’t mean to suggest all post-liberals are race realists!)
That’s not so surprising because at bottom there is nothing noble to be found here. In fact, he is quite explicit about his ambition to provide a “clear career path for right-leaning intellectuals.” (Jan 2) This is, thus, no intrinsic defense of civilization, but merely an attempt to capture some of its lucrative fruits through the political process.
The right had a dominant intellectual apparatus 30 years ago. That's all gone now. Those intellectuals who haven't abandoned the political right have turned themselves into pitiful hacks, abasing themselves before Trump and similar demagogues. Most recently seen with the Federalist Society, which has found itself not servile enough. Trump is indicating that he wants reliable votes from the judiciary, not fancy ideas about originalism.
Cofnas is hanging on to one shred of this: "scientific" racism as espoused by Herrnstein and Murray in the Bell Curve (Murray's subsequent career illustrating the descent into hackery). But it's absurd for anyone on the right to claim the endorsement of science while accepting the idea that climate science, vaccines, renewable energy and so on are the product of a gigantic conspiracy in which virtually all scientists are complicit.
There's still a residual demand on the right for people who can use big words, as there was for Heidegger and Schmitt under the Nazis. But in the end, the right doesn't need them. as both Heidegger and Schmitt found out.
My conclusion is that their is no longer any value in engagement with the intellectual right, or analysis of their views. What matters is to untangle the mess of resentments that motivate the rightwing base and try to separate as many of their supporters as possible.