Cugoano on Modern Slavery

Last week my paper with Nick Cowen and Aris Trantidis, "Democracy as a competitive discovery process," was published online (and open access) in European Journal of Political Economy. I have discussed the paper before so won’t repeat that now.

Yesterday, in order to self-advertise, an invited presentation “Some (Marxist and Liberal) Pre-History to Philosophy as Economic Modeling,” in Salzburg on Friday (see here for info—thank Julien Murzi), I shared a slide from the lecture on Facebook. For reasons that are left unclear to me (‘community violation’), I was immediately banned from Facebook. I have appealed, but welcome to arbitrary governance. Anyway, I re-share the offending slide here. I am a big fan of the people on the slide, so I could be banned for a lot worse reasons.

Today’s post is on a somber topic (and brief). It was triggered by an invite from Diana Popescu (Nottingham) to present later this month at the CRISPI Conference June 2025: The Idea of Freedom and Modern Slavery (here). I love invites that nudge me into expanding my intellectual horizons!

For various reasons I have gotten fascinated by the work the idea of ‘modern’/‘modernity’ does in contemporary philosophy (and political life more generally). So, my paper will be about the rise of the very concept ‘modern slavery.’ As regular readers know I suspect this originates (recall) in a late nineteenth century liberal critique of imperialism by (benevolent racist, alas) classicists; these liberals were familiar with Aristotle and Marx, and needed a term to discuss non-chattel, but forced industrial labor that instrumentalizes the people so used. More on that next week.

But a mild unease sent me back to Thoughts and sentiments on the evil and wicked traffic of the slavery: and commerce of the human species, humbly submitted to the inhabitants of Great-Britain (1787) by Ottobah Cugoano, which I teach annually. As it happens he uses ‘modern’ six times in the work. And each time it is conjoined with (you guessed it) ‘slavery.’

Now, when Cugoano refers to ‘modern slavery,’ he means the slavery practiced on kidnapped ‘black Africans’ (p. 43) in the Carribean sugar islands (e.g., p. 40) by purported ‘Christians’ (p. 64). In addition to ‘modern’ he usually conjoins some version of ‘cruel’ (p. 18; p. 40; p. 43; p. 58) and barbarous’ (p. 40; p. 43) with it.

In fact, we can really discern two reasons for Cugoano’s emphasis on the ‘modern’ nature of modern slavery. First, it is practiced by people who pride themselves on being more advanced than ancient barbarians (pp. 39-40 & p. 58). Cugoano explicitly includes the ancient Romans and Greeks among these barbarians (p. 58). But in their contemporary dehumanizing practices (pp. 17-18) the Europeans reveal themselves as more barbarian than the pagan barbarians. Here Cuguano echoes the rhetorical strategy of Enlightenment reformers of the criminal justice system (Beccaria, André Morellet, Voltaire, and anticipating Grouchy), who would routinely point out that the purported civilized Europeans revealed themselves as more barbarian in their torture than purported barbarians.

Second, he wants to show that the modern institution of slavery knowingly violates the biblical injunction against kidnapping innocent people into slavery. (p. 64; Cuguano does not, in fact, reject all slavery; but about that some other time more.) So, qua Christians, these modern slavers are the worst kind of Christians.

Below the passages that I have relied on:

For the slaves, like animals, are bought and sold, and dealt with as their capricious owners may think fit, even in torturing and tearing them to pieces, and wearing them out with hard labour, hunger and oppression; and should the death of a slave ensue by some other more violent way than that which is commonly the death of thousands, and tens of thousands in the end, the haughty tyrant, in that case, has only to pay a small fine for the murder and death of his slave. The brute creation in general may fare better than man, and some dogs may refuse the crumbs that the distressed poor would be glad of; but the nature and situation of man is far superior o that of beasts; and, in like manner, whatever circumstances poor freemen may be in, their situation is much superior, beyond any proportion, to that of the hardships and cruelty of modern slavery. But where can the situation of any freeman be so bad as that of a slave; or, could such be found, or even worse, as he would have it, what would the comparison amount to? Would it plead for his craft of slavery and oppression? (pp. 17-18)

The barely supplying his slave with some necessary things, to keep him in life, is no reward at all, that is only for his own sake and benefit; and the very nature of compulsion and taking away the liberty of others, as well as their property, is robbery; and that kind of service which subjects men to a state of slavery, must at all times, and in every circumstance, be a barbarous inhuman and unjust dealing with our fellow men. A voluntary service and slavery, are quite different things; but in ancient times, in whatever degree slavery was admitted, and whatever hardships they were, in general, subjected to, it was not nearly so bad as the modern barbarous and cruel West-India slavery. (pp. 39-40)

And, therefore, this may be justly said, that whatever servitude that was, or by whatever name it may be called, that the service which was required by the people of Israel in old time, was of a far milder nature, than that which became the prevalent practice of other different and barbarous nations; and, if compared with modern slavery, it might be called liberty, equity, and felicity, in respect to that abominable, mean, beastly, cruel, bloody slavery carried on by the inhuman, barbarous Europeans, against the poor unfortunate Black Africans. (pp. 42-43)

And therefore, so far as I have been able to consult the law written by Moses, concerning that kind of servitude admitted by it, I can find nothing imported thereby, in the least degree, to warrant the modern practice of slavery. But, on the contrary, and what was principally intended thereby, and in the most particular manner, as respecting Christians, that it contains the strongest prohibition against it. (p. 43)

When they see some base wretches like themselves ensnaring, enslaving, oppressing, whipping, starving with hunger, and cruelly torturing and murdering some of the poor helpless part of mankind, they would think no harm in it, they would do the same. Perhaps the Greeks and Romans, and other crowds of barbarous nations have done so before; they can make that a precedent, and think no harm in it, they would still do the same, and worse than any barbarous nations ever did before: and if they look backwards and forwards they can find no better precedent, ancient or modern, than that which is wicked, mean, brutish, and base. To practise such abominable parallels of wickedness of ensnaring, negociating, and enslaving men, is the scandal and shame of mankind; And what must we think of their crimes? Let the groans and cries of the murdered, and the cruel slavery of the Africans tell! (p. 58)

But thus saith the law of God: If a man be found stealing any of his neighbours, or he that stealeth a man (let him be who he will) and selleth him, or that maketh merchandize of him, or if he be found in his hand, then that thief shall die. However, in all modern slavery among Christians, who ought to know this law, they have not had any regard to it. (p. 64; emphasis in original)