Hobson's realist-liberal arguments against Imperialism.

I am re-reading J.A. Hobson’s (1902) Imperialism: A Study. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the argument presupposes nationalism (and national self-determination) as the foundational political phenomenon of the nineteenth century. In so doing Hobson relies explicitly on J.S. Mill’s account of “genuine nationalism.” (pp. 3-4)

For Hobson there are really five kinds of nationalism (or the political union on the basis of nationality): (i) separatist within a larger empire (say, Greece within Ottoman rule); (ii) centralising/enlarging the realm of nationality (e.g., Italy); (iii) a form of federalism among states (e.g., Germany/North America); (iv) federalism among diverse nationalities (e.g., the Suisse). For Hobson, the second, especially, has a restless “manifest destiny” (p. 2) until all of the co-nationals are incorporated into the borders of same nation-state. I return to the fifth below.

It is worth noting that Hobson thinks some forms of federalism are themselves imperial in character. In fact, “the root idea of empire in the ancient and medieval world was that of a federation of States, under a hegemony.” (p. 6) This kind of imperialism is the foundation of a true internationalism, which is more akin a Kantian league of nations. (Hobson explicitly mentions Kant but does not emphasize the commercial republican nature of a Kantian pacific federation.) In fact, Hobson himself embraces some such federalism rooted in national independence: “A true strong internationalism in form or spirit would rather imply the existence of powerful self-respecting nationalities which seek union on the basis of common national needs and interests.” (p. 9) With the significance of De Gaulle’s federal vision being recovered in Europe, a Hobson revival may not be far off.

Now, Hobson acknowledges that nineteenth century nationalism is itself an effect of the “prolonged resistance” against “Napoleon’s imperial designs.” (p. 3) That is to say, even genuine nationalism is understood as a reactive force and an unintended side-effect of imperial projects.

According to Hobson debased nationalism leads to colonialism and imperialism. Both political phenomena do not respect the natural limitations of nationality; and they propel the nation to “absorb the near or distant territory of reluctant and unassimilable peoples.” (p. 4). For Hobson, colonialism “consists in the migration of part of a nation to vacant or sparsely peopled foreign lands, the emigrants carrying with them full rights of citizenship in the mother country, or else establishing local self-government in close conformity with her institutions and under her final control, may be considered a genuine expansion of nationality, a territorial enlargement of the stock, language and institutions of the nation.” (p. 4) Imperialism, by contrast, consists of the political control of distant or nearby territory that is either empty or filled with reluctant and unassimilable peoples or as he puts it elsewhere “alien and subject people.” (p. 5)

As the previous paragraph already hints, Hobson is not a critic of all settler- colonialism. (Duncan Bell alerted me to this fact.) Some may well represent a kind of ‘genuine expansion’ of nationality, when the colonists “transplant the civilisation they represent to the new natural and social environment in which they find themselves.” (p. 6) Although Hobson recognizes that even in the best such cases a distinct, local nationalism is the likely outcome. (p. 4)

On the other hand, Hobson is a fierce critic of imperialism, which he always treats as a “perversion” of (true) nationalism (p. 9). To the best of my knowledge his criticism is not informed by a right to self-determination of “alien and subject people.” There is plenty of evidence, in fact, that he shares in Mill’s negative views of the capacities of these. (About that some other time.) Hobson’s main argument against imperialism is rooted in opportunity costs: imperialism benefits a small financial clique and those connected to the military (and defense industries) at the expense of ordinary citizens in the home country. (Hobson’s argument isn’t just economic, it’s also cultural.) About this argument some other time more. It’s clearly indebted to Smith’s anti-Mercantilist arguments, but Hobson emphasizes even more than Smith the role of finance in providing the glue of military adventures abroad.

But there are also at least three other subsidiary (and connected) arguments against imperialism. The second argument Hobson attributes to Sir John Robert Seeley (himself an advocate of empire). I quote Hobson’s quote:

When a State advances beyond the limits of nationality its power becomes precarious and artificial. This is the condition of most empires, and it is the condition of our own. When a nation extends itself into other territories the chances are that it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering, them. When this happens it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with, for the subject or rival nationalities cannot be properly assimilated, and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger. (6.)

We can paraphrase the underlying argument as follows: all empires have an internal drive to expand beyond their natural limits of absorption/rule. When they do so, imperial expansion is a source of weakness because one ends up ruling over many potential enemies that have not been properly pacified. We may call this the realist argument against Imperial overstretch or imperial overreach (associated with Paul Kennedy in the last generation of historians). This is rooted in the self-interest of the imperial ruling classes. Lurking in Hobson’s argument is that the enemy is not just within the empire, but in a competitive system of imperial expansion each such internal enemy can be politicized by rival empires and all become weaker than they would otherwise be. (A kind of imperial tragedy of the commons.)

Third, relatedly, and this echoes Napoleon’s impact on the development of intra-European nationalism, competing “aggressive” European global Imperialisms “defeat the movement towards internationalism by fostering animosities among competing empires: its attack upon the liberties and the existence of weaker or lower races [sic] stimulates in them a corresponding excess of national self- consciousness.” (p. 9) Hobson does not seem much concerned about these liberties, but he does think that (v) the conquered are likely to develop a perverted form of nationalism in virtue of being subject peoples. (It’s not wholly clear what makes this a bad form of nationalism in light of his endorsement of (i).) At this point one expects biological racism (of which the book is shamefully not free, alas), but the two examples he gives of weak nations are the Afrikaners and Chinese (and it is pretty clear that he treats their inferiority as cultural — in the way J.S. Mill would — not racial).

And, finally, the fourth argument involves imperialism’s effect on the undermining of cosmopolitan internationalism: “Though the conduct of nations in dealing with one another has commonly been determined at all times by selfish and short-sighted considerations, the conscious, deliberate adoption of this standard at an age when the intercourse of nations and their interdependence for all essentials of human life grow ever closer is a retrograde step fraught with grave perils to the cause of civilisation.” Imperialism self-consciously embraces might makes right, and this standard is catastrophic in an age of global commerce, easy transportation, and mass communication. Hobson grasped perceptively that imperialism would lead to global war on an unprecedented scale; this war would be welcomed by elites, and as he foresaw their ruin.

While Hobson is not wholly without interest in the “liberties and the existence” of imperial subject-nation his anti-imperialism is ultimately not rooted in a cosmopolitan, moral defense of these. Rather, his anti-imperialism is realist-nationalist in character (but a nationalism that can be the foundation for a true internationalism). It’s bad for ruling nations even if it’s good for some among them; and it is bad for global civil society because its endpoint is always ultimately global war.

Let me wrap up. Hobson (1858 – 1940) can never be a hero to us; but he was one of the few eloquent guardians of Cobden’s, John Bright’s, and Adam Smith’s liberal ideals—he is, after all, one of the founders of social liberalism alongside Hobhouse. For us the significance of Hobson is his prudential, less millenarian and non-Manichean and anti-moralizing liberalism than the familiar one from the twentieth century; as America First and mercantile ideology rises and society and economy are closed in order to prosecute great power rivalry with China, Hobson allows us a vocabulary and framework that concedes nothing to our enemies about ordinary people’s real interests and love of nation without turning a blind eye toward the glutton, oligarchic scramble for wealth.