Hume's Illiberal, realist Political theory; with a note on the muscular liberalism found in some branches of Public Choice
In a number of recent posts [recall here, here, here, here, here], I have argued that despite his many proto-liberal contributions to political economy, it is a mistake to treat Hume as a proto-liberal in political theory. I did so not by invoking the charge of anachronism (although I would claim the desirability of attaining and working toward international and federal peace is distinctive of early liberals like Smith, Kant, and Bentham and this is noticeably absent in Hume), but on more substantive grounds. Hume’s account of balance of power (and ostracism) reveal in him rather realist commitments about the nature of international politics and I domestic political life, and that his support of ostracism also reveal a lack of commitment to the rule of law. Simply put: he sees politics as zero-sum, and (while he clearly likes the win-win possibilities of trade) he thinks politics cannot be avoided.
There are other reasons to avoid treating Hume as a proto-liberal.* He is not altogether an egalitarian about who falls under the institution of justice (see EMP 3.18), and he clearly also thinks (on consequentialist and reason of state grounds) that civilizing function of the rule of law can be extended violently (recall here). But let’s leave that aside. I want to call attention to two major illiberal features of his distinctive political philosophy.
It’s well known that Hume is a critic of the social contract theory. Of course, I don’t think Hume’s reservations about the social contract as such make him illiberal in anyway.
In fact, “Of Original Contract” (1748) Hume grants that in something like the state of nature (or pure anarchy), prior to literacy or education and civilization, there exists natural equality and that one can then expect binding temporary social contracts to create military commanders. But such original contracts can never bind future generations and (on Hume’s view) would not have bound the parties to it once the reason or functional grounds for the contract had disappeared. (He does think that elected military commanders are the start of a pathway into more enduring forms of political organization and institutions so such contract are not irrelevant to history.) In fact, and as an aside (and as discerned by Foucault in the Birth of Biopolitics), lurking in Hume’s is the Spinozistic doctrine that once the utility and function that generates a promise has disappeared, the promise is not binding anymore.
Also, to be clear, Hume does not deny that a social contract would be legitimate. In fact, for Hume consent is “surely the best and most sacred of any” foundation of government. He just thinks it is irrelevant in the world. For Hume “almost all the governments…have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest” and “force and violence.”
Now, it is important to see that this observation is not merely an empirical point for Hume. He clearly thinks that post facto consent to established authority does not add further legitimacy to it. Rather, and this is my first argument, he thinks it’s pretty irrelevant to political authority:
Now, it is important to note that the mere fact that Hume thinks states are founded on force is not my main ground for thinking that he is not a liberal. His claim that a government founded on force and usurpation can be legitimate is while problematic, perhaps, not wholly incompatible with some forms of liberalism. It is, however, worth noting that usually Marxists and conservatives criticize liberals for denying or obscuring this very point. So, if Hume were a political liberal he is a very much non-standard one. Below I want to offer more important evidence for this claim.
Before I continue, I want to also make sure that the contemporary significance of this discussion is on the table. The Virginia public choice theorist, Richard Wagner has been developing what he and his followers call, “Entangled Political Economy.” There is much to admire in and learn from this program, but I have (recall) expressed unease about Wagner calls a “muscular versions of liberalism.” Crucially, “for the muscular version of liberalism, free societies are not self-sustaining, and can degenerate without the proper use of force.” Unfortunately, this proper use of force may well involve non-trivial violations of basic civil rights. I am not alone to have demurred from such muscular liberalism (see especially this (2023) Public Choice paper by Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler). Of course, again, critics of some versions of neoliberalism think that authoritarianism is a feature and not a bug.
Now, to articulate his position Wagner relies on the autonomy of the political. In his argument, Wagner is inspired by not just Schmitt, but also the Italian elite theorists and Burnham. To simplify, they all believe that in all political societies, the few rule the many. As a sociological doctrine, this may well be unobjectionable. But when it is endorsed as an unproblematic fact of the matter, we slide from description to acceptance. So, among illiberal realists, the autonomy of the political presupposes, thus, the role of force in securing authority (where right follows might) and the idea that necessarily the few govern the many.
So much for set up; let me return to Hume. I think Hume, too, embraces something like the autonomy of the political in the service of an elite theory. In his essay, “Of the First Principles of Government” (1741), Hume is famously committed to the idea that “on opinion only…government is founded.” (Apologies for making him sound like Yoda the Jedi.) There is nothing illiberal about this and it clearly inspired, say, Madison (Federalist 49 without mention of Hume) and Dicey, who explicitly cites Hume (see, lecture 1 of Law & Opinion). In fact, what liberals take from Hume is, what I have recently called “Platonic Skepticism;” in political life we do not expect, in all respects, a regime of truth in part because we understand it is very costly and time-consuming to establish and, in part, because society’s u.nderlying pluralism makes this a likely source of conflict.
Hume himself recognizes three major kinds of opinion that secure government authority: (i) recognition of its function in the public interest, that is, a kind of output legitimacy, one may say; (ii) a status quo bias that secures authority to any well established government (Hume calls this a “right to power;”) and (iii) a government that secures and defends property of its citizens. I doubt all liberals would agree with all three without any qualms. But let’s leave that aside. My interest is in Hume’s comment at this point:
Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to power, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many.—”Of the First Principles of Government.” [Emphasis in original]
It is important to realize that this not a mere aside, a singular quote out of context. Rather, the whole essay is meant to explain “the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers.”
This is the source of second argument to deny that Hume is a liberal. He endorses here, and arguably anticipates, the Italian Elite school on the key point under consideration. Arguably Hume should be treated as a founder or major anticipation of that school.
Now, one may well object, again, that Hume is merely offering an empirical claim. He is writing as anatomist of human affairs in the science of man. That may well be so. I don’t want to deny that Hume’s interest is factual. But it is worth nothing that he explicitly claims that his doctrine holds for both free and despotic governments. So by itself the sociological thesis is treated as normatively unproblematic. And Hume is more than happy to express a normative preference for some political orders over others.
And, in fact, that is the point of the final paragraph of Hume’s essay ”Of the First Principles of Government.” When he considers the possibility that Britain might turn into a pure republic, he rejects it on the grounds that it cannot function in a large state because the people are incapable of such self-government. He then closes with the following wish, and this expresses his view all too clear “Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as possible, without encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.” The problem here is not the Burkean preference for established government, but that this government reliably secures rule of the few over the many.
Of course, Hume’s preference for the ancient government is not merely status quo bias. He also thinks it secures important freedom(s). Many of those freedoms are also cherished by liberals. But Hume’s defense of them is often (not always, of course) fundamentally illiberal and more realist in character. Of course, there are branches of liberal realism, but none of these embrace the two Humean commitments I have singled out in this post.
I have not tried to define liberalism here (see my recent blogging on that). All I have claimed is that there is a lot of converging evidence that when it comes to central areas of his political theory, Hume is actually far removed from fairly humdrum liberal commitments, even ones we can discern in Smith, Kant, and Bentham. And while liberalism has many debts to Hume’s philosophy and social theory, I would also argue that it was founded in key rejections of it. But that’s for another time.
*Not to mention his antisemitism and racism.