In a much cited (2004) article, "John Locke, Carolina, and the two treatises of government" (Political Theory) David Armitage notes that “at least since the early eighteenth century, the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669) have been central to understanding the relationship between Locke’s political theory and his colonial interests.” It’s not entirely clear what he has in mind. The accompanying footnote cites modern scholarship.*
I think he means by this that Pierre Desmaizeaux published it in 1720 in A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr John Locke. This work includes Locke’s “Fundamental Constitutions,” as the first piece presented. Armitage cites it in a subsequent note attached to this sentence: “Locke’s hand in the Fundamental Constitutions was also taken to vindicate the role of theory in the world of governmental practice: after all, who better than such a “great philosopher” to design a new commonwealth?” That sentence nicely summarizes the opening claims of Desmaizeuax’s “dedication” to A Collection.
But it doesn’t follow that Locke’s “Fundamental Constitutions” was thereby central to eighteenth century thinkers in understanding the relationship between Locke’s political theory and his colonial interests. Even if Desmaizeuax's work were widely circulated, one would need to trace out discussions or citations of it.
Such (attenuated) evidence for his claim is provided by Armitage in the same paragraph: “To Locke’s admirers, his presumed authorship of a constitution that granted uniquely broad religious toleration was a source of genuine pride. Thus Voltaire advised, “Cast your eyes over the other hemisphere, behold Carolina, of which the wise Locke was the legislator.”” That’s a quote (as Armitage notes in an accompanying footnote) from Voltaire’s Traité de la tolérance (1763), which (let’s stipulate) was incredibly widely read. In what follows, I assume Desmaizeuax's 1720 publication is Voltaire’s source.
That leaves a forty plus year gap between Desmaizeuax’s publication and Voltaire’s Treaty on Tolarance. So, I am a bit unsure how much attention was given to the connection between Locke’s political theory and his colonial interests at all in the first half of the eighteenth century.
But, perhaps, we can narrow the gap a bit because Voltaire had already engaged with the topic in his Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations, which he stared publishing in 1757. However, I am not entirely sure in what year and in what volume the following passage was first published (I located it in a French 1769 edition), so it’s possible it may have be subsequent to the Treaty of Tolerance. But I have seen evidence it dates from 1761.+ Here’s the key passage (in translation):
While others have read into Voltaire’s writings a criticism of slavery, I am not entirely persuaded. It’s noticeable that here he omits any criticism of Locke on the issue of slavery. In fact, he implies that any family will have about 50-80 slaves each. I return to this below. (In subsequent pages slave colonies are discussed without any moral criticism, although there is a hint of an economic criticism.)
Rather he praises Locke for successfully exporting religious toleration. This fits Voltaire’s larger project and views, of course. Voltaire is here summarizing Article 97 of Locke’s “Fundamental Constitutions.” Before I get to this, Article 96 makes the Church of England the establish Church of the Carolinas with the buildings and Churchmen on the pay-roll of (and controlled by) the Dominion. Desmaizeaux adds a footnote that this particular article was not drawn up by Locke and against his wishes.
Article 97 explicitly introduces religious toleration because the aboriginal locals would inevitably have different religious views and it “would be unreasonable for us on this account to keep them out.” So, here Locke follows Las Casas and agrees that forcible conversion (or murder) of the locals would be unjust. So, as Barbara Arneil famously argued, while Locke most certainly is an advocate of settler-colonialism where lands are not used productively, he does explicitly recognize constraints on one’s attitudes toward natives. (Later, in article 112 purchase or gift of native-lands by settlers is explicitly forbidden; and while undoubtedly the privileges of the Lords proprieters are being protected here, it does also suggest that settling of native lands is strictly regulated.)
In fact, in the next sentence of Article 97 this toleration is justified in terms of the need to maintain civic peace. (This argument is usually associated with Spinoza and Bayle.)
It’s only at this point that Article 97, includes “Jews, Heathens, and other Dissenters from the purity of Christianity” in its principle of toleration. Here the official justification is that these may learn “to learn about the truth and reasonableness of its doctrines.” Atheists are explicitly excluded. In fact, it’s not entirely clear if Catholics are tolerated, although I have no reason to disagree with Voltaire otherwise (although Catholics were usually thought of as seditious, which article 103 prohibits and as not falling under religious toleration).
There is, however, a peculiarity in Voltaire’s treatment. Article 97 states “any seven, or more persons, agreeing in any religion, shall constitute a church or a profession.” This makes no mention of slaves or that a church may number six hundred souls. I don’t mean to suggest Voltaire is mistaken. Article 107 clearly allows that slaves can join any church they think fit. This is, in fact, the first mention of slavery in the “Fundamental Constitutions.” It goes on to claim that slaves will be “as fully members as freemen” of any church.
This makes it seem that seven slaves could each start a church. But this is, again, qualified and attenuated in Article 110, where “every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.” It’s the only mention of the race of the slaves in the Fundamental Constitutions, and it also de facto implies that the native Americans shall not be enslaved. Article 110 helps explain and justify Voltaire’s interpretation of Locke’s “Fundamental Constitutions” although I am unsure what the source of the size of the congregations would be.
I could stop here. But that would be a bit misleading. Let me explain and take, briefly, a step back from Voltaire. In his article, Armitage, correctly, disassociates Locke’s Second Treatise (especially chapter V) from a polemic about the frame of government for Pennsylvania. (This is something James Tully had once argued.)
However, in Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations, Voltaire does compare and contrast Locke with Penn. And this is decidedly unfavorable to Locke. For, only a few paraphs beyond the treatment of Carolina, Voltaire writes:
Beyond this lies Pennsylvania, a country differing from all the rest of the world by the singular manners of its inhabitants. This country received its name and laws, in 1680, from one William Penn, the head of a new sect, which have very improperly been called Quakers. This was not an usurped power, as were most of those invasions which we have seen both in the old and new world. Penn purchased these lands of the real natives, and became a lawful proprietor in the most rigid sense of the word.
Voltaire clearly implies that except for Pennsylvania nearly all other forms of settler-colonialism are forms of illegitimate conquest. In wider context the implication is that all other European possessions in the Americas are not truly lawful. (Here’s the sentence in Voltaire’s French: Penn acheta le terrain des indigènes, et devint le propriétaire le plus légitime.)** And, in fact, he goes on to praise Pennsylvania’s pacific attitude toward the locals, “if Penn and his followers erred in their theology—that inexhaustible source of misfortunes and disputes—they at least excelled all other people in the strictness of their morals. Though situated in the midst of twelve small nations, whom we term savages, they have never had the least dispute with any of them.”
There is a lot more to be said about Voltaire’s attitude toward Penn and Quakers, who are (after all) the heroes of his earlier (and more famous) Philosophical Letters. But in so far as there is a model constitution and lawgiver for Voltaire it’s not Locke but William Penn that is exemplary (say, in the way that King Alfred is for Hume).
For Voltaire Penn doesn’t merely excel Locke’s blueprint in toleration, but also shows the real possibility of international pacific relations. Lurking throughout Voltaire’s argument is (to use anachronism) a proto-liberal moral critique of mercantile international relations (of which Locke is the key theorist). William Penn was also one of the leading theorists of federalism of the era. This set of arguments are combined and developed by Adam Smith (who we know was an admirer of Voltaire) in Wealth of Nations.
*One of these, "The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina as a Tool for Lockean Scholarship." Interpretation 17 (1989): 127-43, was written by a then student, Celia McGuiness Celia, and is quite impressive. I do wonder what became of this McGuiness!
+ Hunting, Claudine. “The Philosophes and Black Slavery: 1748-1765.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 39, no. 3, 1978, .p. 409, note 8.
**The translation use of ‘usurpation’ exaggerates the point, but not the intent.