On Assad's Departure

Last week, as I was collecting my thoughts on how to understand the political turmoil in France, Germany, and South Korea, I postponed writing on it because I wondered whether the fall of Aleppo was signaling a wider seismic shift in the Middle East’s balance of power. Events in Syria then unfolded much faster than I expected. And it turns out that today, with the flight of Assad, the Arab Spring has, after all, belatedly claimed the fall of one of the worst dictatorships.

A bit of a year ago, when on October 8, 2023, Hassan Nasrallah, decided to open a second front “in solidarity" (Reuters, 10/8/23) with the Palestinian people he acted, as I argued, recklessly. It was reckless, because the Israeli political and military leadership had been waiting for an opportunity to revisit the 2006 War for close to a generation, and the way Hezbollah articulated its initial war aims it gave Hamas an effective veto over its participation in the fight with Israel. Because Hezbollah also signaled it did not wish for a wider war, Israel was constantly able to fight against Hezbollah with initiative and exploit its superior intelligence and firepower. This 8 October decision did not save Hamas (and probably emboldened it too much to keep on fighting way too long); it led to enormous civilian fatalities and property damage in Lebanon, and, ultimately, Hezbollah’s military defeat and, thereby, most unexpected to the collapse of his Syrian ally.

A few months ago, I wrote (correctly) that “Hezbollah’s main political achievement of the last decade [is] arming and saving Assad’s tyrannical regime (even by its own lights) from defeat in a bitter civil war…” I didn’t realize how thoroughly true this statement was. It turns out Hezbollah’s (and Iran’s) fighting power had become the prime pillar of Assad’s regime.

With Hezbollah’s catastrophic defeat by Israel, Israel’s air supremacy, which seem to have destroyed Iran’s air defenses and subsequent successful deterrence of Iran inside Syria and Lebanon, and Russia’s stretched militarily in Ukraine, Assad’s own regime had no allies nor the will or capacity to fight on anymore.* (This raises interesting questions about the Syrian Alawites capacity to influence any further outcomes.)

I hope for the Syrian people and its neighbors that there will be a relatively stable and relatively benign successor regime that can find a way to restore civil life with dignity and security for all. A lot will depend on to what degree Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel can resist the temptation to meddle anew, and the capacity of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani to grow from rebel leader to statesman.

I will be curious to see if Al-Jolani wishes to focus on Syria’s non-trivial political, constitutional, and economic challenges, and if he is willing to welcome back Syria’s former middle class many of whom fled abroad and, thereby, reverse the brain drain and economic misfortunes that Syria has suffered during the past decade. One of his biggest initial challenges will be to reconcile Kurdish aspirations and Turkish suspicions thereof.

As noted, the impact of the fall of Syria’s dictator will also be felt by its neighbors (many sheltering millions of Syrian refugees) not the least in Lebanon. For, the collapse of Assad’s regime — and a massively weakened Hezbollah (without relentless flow of Iranian arms and advisors) — may also allow Lebanon to regain genuine sovereignty over its own territory, and the resumption of more normal bread and butter domestic politics.

An important larger strategic issue is that Russia’s military bases in Syria are at risk. If they have to be abandoned this effectively removes Russia from the middle east and its naval forces from the Mediterranean. Somewhat astonishingly, just as it is preparing to crow victory in Ukraine, its capacity to shape outcomes or even act as spoiler in Europe’s underbelly may well be destroyed for a generation.

In addition, Iran’s so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ is in shambles. And, perhaps, this latest setback will encourage it to revisit its more general strategic orientation. Despite lacking numbers and resources, it has tried to dominate the middle east. It and its allies have nothing to show for it now. Perhaps, a more sober foreign policy is in store for it, especially because it seems to fear genuinely Trump’s willingness to use American power against it.

In re-reading this post, I realize I am uncommonly hopeful. That’s not because I can discern the future for Syria, but rather that’s because I agree with Hobbes, Adam Smith, and Aristotle that the end of civil war — if (!) we have reached it! — is always the end of the most awful political catastrophe. So, Assad’s defeat by Syrians is good news for Syria, and there are many reasons to suspect that many Syria’s neighbors will benefit, too.

Before long, I hope to write a follow up post on what the collapse of Assad means for peace-prospects between Israel and Syria and Lebanon, while not ignoring Gaza. But about that some other time.