On Federalist Papers 18, imbecility and distraction, the new federalism, and the Achaeans

As I noted a few days ago (here) in a piece on the reception of Polybius by Hume, I noted that in Federalist Papers 18 ‘Publius’ also discusses the Achaean League. In the Ancient world, the Achaeans comes as close to approximating what Constant called the new federalism (which (recall) I have recently traced back to More’s Utopia).

Now Federalist 18, looks at two Greek leagues. The first, the “Amphictyonic council” has the characteristics of what Constant called the ‘old’ federalism. In the old federalism, states entered into mutual defense and non-aggression pacts, but did not interfere in each other’s domestic affairs which could be governed by whatever was the local equilibrium (see also below). In addition, these loose unions lacked fixed borders among each other and often went to war to each other when foreign threat was absent. Hamilton and Madison only mention the Amphictyonic council as a negative exemplar “because it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States.”

I don’t mean to suggest that the Amphictyonic league or the early US Confederation lacked all commonality. As Hamilton and Madison note, the former was unified as “the guardians of religion.” In practice, the Amphictyonic league was a vehicle for a particular polity’s temporary dominance of Greece. (Hamilton and Madison cite Plutarch as an authority on this point, but they also appeal to a “judicious observer” and I think it’s pretty obvious they are thinking of Polybius.) And this was simultaneously the source of her vulnerability even in the service of its main function—preventing foreign domination.

Now, the Achaean league also ended up succumbing to a “quite similar catastrophe” (foreign domination), but Hamilton and Madison add “it by no means equally deserved it.” The merits of this judgment, and the underlying principle, is worth pondering. But perhaps for another time. Here’s how they describe its institutional structure:

The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.

It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems.

This description is obviously indebted to Book 2 of Polybius’ Histories (although they cite Mably, who also draws on Polybius).

Now, the first quoted paragraph makes it seem that the Achaean league is just a nicely designed instance of an ‘old’ federal union. At the federal level, the component polities that are represented in the senate. The key innovation being that foreign policy is wholly integrated with the independent units deprived from the right to declare war. (In practice this seems to have been highly attenuated.) And crucially at all times a federal office/branch (a senate or the executive branch) is in charge of foreign affairs.

However, the second paragraph suggests that in order to be part of league, the states had to harmonize a lot: “same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money.” How to coordinate having the same laws and customs, especially, without supremacy of the federal center is hard to imagine. So, it begins to look that the Achaean league is the historical originator of the new kind of federalism. (Some other time I will discuss Plato’s seventh letter (and the Laws.))

We have it on the good authority of Polybius that the component units of Achaean league had extensive free speech and direct democracy (for free men).* It’s crucial to Constant’s definition of a new federalism, that the internal order of a federal state is also representative in character. But among the Achaeans the structure of the federal level and the structure of the component level are not identical (or fractal) as they are supposed to in the new federalism. (To put it in Kant’s terms the federal union is a commercial republic constituted by commercial republics.) In the League’s polities, each voting member is treated alike, in the league council each polity is treated alike. (Of course, in practices the relative manpower and wealth of the units generated unequal distribution of power and responsibility.)

As we would put it, in the Achaean league individuals are represented unequally at the federal level. Somewhat amazingly, the work least associated with individualism, More’s Utopia, corrects for this outcome by making each polity alike in number in the Utopian federation.

Now, the Achaean league is praised by ‘Publius’ because despite being built on polities organized as direct democracies (or “popular government”), they lack the excessive class turmoil characteristic of most other Greek democratic poli. And Hamilton and Madison accept the interpretation proposed by Mably that the “general authority and laws” of the league was a source of moderation.

Unfortunately, they do not offer an explicit explanation for how this mechanism is supposed to work. Presumably the authority of the league is founded on its democratic foundation and its ability to secure independence and freedom for is member states. But the more important work is done by the following: the expectation or requirement of uniformity of the laws create enormous status quo bias in the League. Basically, a persistent local demand for change in the laws is de facto a demand for exit from the union if the other states do not adopt the same laws. But such exit is unattractive given the existence of powerful enemies (who have no interest in preserving democracy or free speech).

Of course, such status quo bias is also a source of inflexibility. And one may well wonder to what degree the stability and moderation gained from the union, also meant that some urgent political issues were unaddressed. These could become a source of faction or dissatisfaction.

I would want to stop here.

Madison and Hamilton also comment on the downfall of the Achaean league. Now, at first one may think they follow Hume (without mentioning him) in treating it as an effect of the failure of thinking properly about the balance of power. But their actual diagnosis is slightly different. Twice they note the real problem: “The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally is but another name for a master.” And again, in a slightly different context: “Finding themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms.”

In age of growing empires, the League was too weak and small to survive as an independent power. For Publius (and we may include Plato) sometimes even the best constitution is overcome by bad luck. (Plato treats Locri as an example of this.) Of course, Hamilton and Madison might be confident that the Unites States can avoid this fate because it will be huge and lack powerful nearby enemies. Manifest Destiny and the Monroe doctrine are, in part, the ideologies that makes this reality.

But I don’t think this is the end of the matter. Hume (and perhaps Polybius) might claim that this was due to their inability to play their cards well in a complex balance of power. (The obvious example is Hiero II, who figured out a way to keep Syracuse independent despite the great power rivalry between Rome and Carthage.) So, what’s needed is a good understanding of the political art. (As I have noted Ukraine’s structural weakness is in part due to its ongoing inability to get Russia’s natural enemies (Turkey, Iran, China, Japan etc.), other than Poland, to take even a cursory interest in its survival.

While Madison and Hamilton note the moderation of the Achaeans in ordinary times, in the context of political crisis, the League did not manage to avoid factional disunity:

Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal liberty…seduced…the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had commenced.

The problem with such disunity is not just that domestic factions may ally with foreign powers. The real problem is that (in our lingo) domestic factions become a conduit for foreign propaganda and lies, and thereby undermine the unity needed to stick together. But that’s not even the ultimate problem. This is that the domestic factions may well end up, thereby, promoting “imbecility and distraction” and so corrupt the quality of public deliberation that enters into decision-making (including the inability to follow the logic of balance of power, where needed).

Not for the first time (recall) I am struck by the fact that I find the Federalist Papers most prescient on the defects of the constitution it promotes rather than its virtues.

*I am unsure whether there was a property restriction, but I assume not given the way the democracies are described by Polybius.