On Prudential Liberalism, Bright and Historiography of political theory, pt. II
One of the peculiarities of the reception of nineteenth century liberalism is that the most popular and influential liberals of the age, Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone, are almost wholly absent in the works that discuss it. So, one of the greatest books written on it, Jennifer Pitts’s (2005) A turn to empire: The rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France, only mentions Gladstone in passing. The same is true of a book I praise frequently, William Selinger’s (2019) Parliamentarism, From Burke to Weber. But the examples can be multiplied. They are all three unmentioned in Alan Ryan’s massive On Politics, one of whose main centers of gravity is arguably nineteenth century political thought (devoting 4 out of 27 chapters to it).
Helena Rosenblatt’s (2018) The Lost History of Liberalism (a book I often engage with) is an important exception to this, in part, by including a notable section on “Gladstone, Liberal Icon” (pp. 177-182) that describes his views, warts and all. Her treatment of Gladstone is framed, however, by Max Weber’s interpretation of him in terms of charismatic leadership (p. 179 & 181). Fair enough. But it has the explicit intention of downplaying his ideas (pp. 178-9). She then goes on to state,
Like Lincoln, Gladstone was admired for the way he addressed and inspired the masses. In countless soaring and sermon-like speeches, he appealed to their moral sense, reason, and intelligence. Always, he exhorted them to selflessness, patriotism, and devotion to the common good. Workers came in droves and listened for hours. He seemed to hear them, to know and respect them— and they responded with trust and admiration. From the very beginning of his leadership of the Liberal Party, workers supported the liberals at the polls. (p. 179)
One would never know that Gladstone here followed the example of Cobden and, especially, Bright who had laid the foundation for this kind of politics not just in the (free trade) Anti-Corn-Law League, but also in the Reform league (which advocated expansion of the franchise).
In Rosenblatt’s narrative Bright and Cobden are mentions once as follows:
Frédéric Bastiat was also a virulent critic of colonialism, calling it “revolting.” Henri Fonfrède, another leading liberal publicist, called the colonization of Algerian territory “shameful.” The French were not civilizing, he said; they were exterminating.
Such thinking aligned French critics of colonialism with British free traders like Richard Cobden and John Bright, leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League. They too denounced an empire based on violent conquest that served the interests of only a small minority of the population. In Bright’s famous words, the empire was “a gigantic system of out-door relief for the aristocracy.” (p. 115)
Now, when I started this post, I thought this passage would be a useful occasion to discuss some of Bright’s great speeches on India. But what gave me pause was that Rosenblatt actually doesn’t supply a reference to Bright’s speech. The reason I was curious because I thought I remembered seeing a phrase like it in a speech that I had looked at when I was explored Bright’s criticism on the balance of power (recall this post). Perhaps, Bright used the phrase in different contexts?
Luckily, in this day and age such things can be tracked down with some ease. The salient passage was much quoted in the nineteenth century. And can be found in Volume 1, chapter XVI, of The Life and Speeches of John Bright (there are variants in the title), edited by George Barnett Smith. The speech is known as the ‘second’ speech to his Birmingham constituents of October 1858 given on the 29th. The circumstances of the speech are a bit amazing because when he had been voted in, he had been largely unknown to his constituents being unable to campaign due to illness. (He had lost his earlier Manchester seat due to his unpopular opposition against the Crimean war.) Anyway, here’s the passage that’s reproduced in the Life:
The speaker next observed that the great territorial families of England, which were enthroned at the Revolution, had followed their prey like the jackals of the desert: as a consequence of the foreign policy which he denounced, from the time of William III wars had been multiplied, taxes increased, loans made, and the Government expenditure greatly augmented.' There is no actuary in existence,' said Mr. Bright (in a passage of his speech which was warmly cheered, though it subsequently gave great offence in many quarters),' who can calculate how much of the wealth, of the strength, of the supremacy of the territorial families of England has been derived from an unholy participation in the fruits of the industry of the people, which have been wrested from them by every device of taxation, and squandered in every conceivable crime of which a Government could possibly be guilty. The more you examine this matter, the more you will come to the conclusion which I have arrived at, that this foreign policy, this regard for "the liberties of Europe," this care at one time for "the Protestant interests," this excessive love for the "balance of power," is neither more nor less than a gigantic system of outdoor relief for the aristocracy of Great Britain .' (Great laughter.).” pp. 485-486 (emphasis added)
So, strictly speaking this is not an argument against empire at all.* (Bright’s views on empire and colonies are worth attention, but that’s for another occasion.) It is, rather, an argument against the two competing (and inconsistent) pillars of British foreign policy in Europea: the so-called ‘balance of power’ doctrine (associated with Palmerston) and a doctrine we may call ‘liberal interventionism’ (associated increasingly with Gladstone).
Somewhat oddly, that makes Bright’s position also quite salient. Because these doctrines shape policy debates to this day in our empire. Bright reminds us that our foreign policy establishment gives us too limited a number of options.
For, Bright recognizes that both doctrines inevitably involve an open-ended commitment to miliary intervention of some sort or another (and so the maintenance of a large military establishment). The problem is not just that war (preparation) is very expensive and primarily benefits a few concentrated interests (not the least the aristocracy), but also that war itself, howsoever noble its original cause, creates opportunities for “every conceivable crime.”
Because there is no commitment here to expanding international law and no talk of rights, it is very hard for us to recognize in Bright’s words a liberal position (and even Rosenblatt mis-describes it.) And this, I submit is a real tragedy.
But his stance is fueled by Bright’s more general sense that war itself generates the conditions for immoral conduct and moral monstrosities. And this is, in fact, the moral high ground not the least because it is so evidently true. War is most dangerous to human rights and civil liberties. This is a commitment to a higher form of moralism that tracks the self-interest of his audience not to pay taxes for wasteful wars. This joining together of prudence and morality is, in fact, characteristic of the liberal art of government. The genius of Bright’s speeches is that he always manages to explain how policy effects ordinary citizens.
As I noted before, despite his Quaker upbringing Bright is not a pacifist. He is also not an isolationist because he champions free trade and, with Cobden, piecemeal functional integration of states to secure more durable peace. His is a species of prudential liberalism that does not distrust its own power, but that prefers to seek mutual accommodation through arbitration.
During the twentieth century advocates of balance of power and so-called liberal internationalism managed to discredit alternatives as ‘isolationism.’ Undoubtedly this was motivated by the great debate over what do with America’s sudden empire. But in part this was also the effect of an imperfect stewardship of liberalism which was left without an adequate vocabulary and political program to resist militarism and the visible jobs and concentrated income it provides. But we need a more prudential, less millenarian and Manichean liberalism as America exports weapons into armed conflicts and both major parties prepare to close the economy in order to prosecute great power rivalry with China (and Russia).
*Google will inform you that Rosenblatt is by no means the first person to treat Bright’s phrase as an attack on empire as such.
+Empire continues to fascinate