Schmitt and the Myth about Mill and Free Speech, Benjamin Constant, and even some Spinozism

As regular readers know (recall, for example, here; here, here, and here) I believe it should be widely known — at least since the work of Jill Gordon (1997) — that J.S. Mill did not defend the idea that the market place of ideas would inevitably lead to truth. In my view Mill does not associate free speech with a market place in ideas nor does he think that unfettered speech will (via a kind of invisible or providential hand) lead to truth. Let’s call this the ‘Mill free speech Myth.’

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (ca 1919) did conceptualize the acceptance of ideas in a kind of marketplace, but he did not expect that truth would inevitably win out in it. (That would, in fact, be surprising for somebody with such a skeptical tendency.) Moreover, the phrase “marketplace of ideas” doesn’t start the appear until the 1930s, and only begins to circulate in 1940s (recall here). In my view, Kalven (yes from the Kalven report) is the first to articulate the myth as associated with Mill, "It is keyed, in the tradition-honored phrases of Milton, Mill, and Holmes, to confidence that truth will not be bested in a fair fight, to competition in the marketplace of ideas." (p. 516)

But I had also noticed that back in the day (1922) Carl Schmitt (yes that one) had associated freedom of speech in the “continental liberal” position in which truth will emerge automatically through voting as following from 'the system of Condorcet.'*

This is all a bit confused as an interpretation of Condorcet. And I had concluded that Schmitt is the source of the idea that liberalism is intrinsically committed to the idea that truth naturally will emerge from free discussion. This idea is associated with Condorcet (who was indeed a proponent of freedom of speech). But it's based on a (perhaps honest) misunderstanding of the jury theorem and the role it plays in Condorcet's thought.

So far set up. Recently, I re-read Benjamin Constant’s (1814) The Spirit of conquest and Usurpation, in Biancamaria Fontana’s (CUP) translation (in Benjamin Constant: Political Writings). This translation includes material added to the fourth edition as a supplement. In its first chapter “On Innovation, reform, and the uniformity and stability of Institutions,” we read the following:

But if authority will only remain silent, the individuals will speak up, the clash of ideas will generate enlightenment, and it will soon be impossible to mistake the general feeling. You have here an infallible as well as easy means, freedom of the press; that freedom to which we must always return; that freedom which is as necessary to governments as it is to the people; that freedom, the violation of which, in this respect, is a crime against the state. (p. 150)

Armed with this knowledge, I am happy to suggest Constant anticipates the Mill free speech Myth, and perhaps originates it (sans attribution to Mill, of course). As it turns out, I am, of course, not the first to notice that (see, for example, John Lachs "Mill and Constant: A neglected connection in the history of the idea of liberty." History of Philosophy Quarterly 9.1 (1992): 94). So I do not claim any originality here.

In fact, since Constant is, in a certain sense, the father of continental liberalism it would makes sense if Schmitt (or Wolzendorff*) had misremembered this, and somehow had attributed the view to Condorcet (and then added voting for good measure).

That the clash of ideas will generate enlightenment has just the right providential character that is lurking in the Mill free speech Myth. I very much doubt Mill was such a providentialist on which he strikes me as agnostic (to use Huxley’s phrase), but I have not gone back to read his essay on Theism.

Here’s where things get fun. A natural reading of the The Spirit of conquest and Usurpation suggests that Constant is a providentialist. For example, in Part II, chapter 13 (“religion under arbitrary power”) when describing “a nation bent under the burden of superstition and ignorance” he characterizes it (inter alia) as “fallen from the rank which Providence had assigned to mankind.” (p. 129) In the same chapter (the page before), he states the following (which we may call a ‘progressive enlightenment problem of evil’),

It must be admitted that for an enlightened people, despotism is the strongest argument against the existence of Providence. I say for an enlightened people, because peoples who are still ignorant may be oppressed without their religious conviction being diminished. (p. 128)

Lurking here is the idea that the ‘spirit’ of progress which is so characteristic of Enlightenment generates a sociological situation in which there is a more fragile belief in providential order. Significant political setbacks (as despotism is) risks shattering faith in providence. I have no idea whether this is true, but ages that lack belief in progress (say because they have cyclical or pessimistic views of social improvement) are evidently not at risk of losing faith in providence this way. It’s an odd doctrine to introduce when you are trying to convince people that despotism won’t last!

What gave me further pause is the following. Only a few short chapters, really just a few pages before, in chapter 10 (“A sophism in favour of arbitrary power”), Constant explicitly quotes the following from Spinoza: “It is absurd to believe that the only man not to be led astray by his passions will be precisely the one whose situation is such that he is surrounded by the strongest!” (p. 116) Fontana (nor myself) could locate this passage, although Fontana plausibly suggests it might be an allusion to the content of Political Treatise, chapters 6-7.

The fake-ish quote is the only explicit reference to Spinoza. Even when there are other possible echoes of Spinoza in the work, Constant has a tendency to cite Montesquieu or Machiavelli. So, it is not wholly impossible that Constant never read Spinoza or read Spinoza in a mangled version (via Bayle or Voltaire or Diderot’s Encyclopedia.)

As is well known nearly all of Spinoza’s philosophy undermines the idea of providence. And even among Enlightened opinion, throughout the eighteenth century Spinoza was associated with a debate to what degree a society of atheists would be stable or not. (Obviously, atheists don’t believe in god’s providence at all.)

However, in the (1670) Theological Political Treatise (chapter 15), Spinoza articulates the “doctrines of the universal faith” that he implies are “salutary” perhaps “necessary in the republic, if people are to live peacefully and harmoniously.” The third tenet is explicitly meant to underwrite belief in benovelent providence, that is, “the equity of the Justice by which [God] directs all.” (I have quoted from Curley’s translation.)

I am not a Constant scholar, so I don’t want to suggest I have much confidence in the (ahh) Straussian reading of him that I am hinting at. But don’t be surprised if you see me blogging about his (rather long) work De la Religion in the near future.

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*Recall:

His definition of the bourgeoisie as a clasa discutidora and his recognition that its religion resides in freedom of speech and of the press are examples. I do not consider this to be the last word om Continental liberalism in its entirety, but it is certainly a most striking observation. In view of the system of a Condorcet, for example, whose typical meaning Wolzendorff, perhaps because of intellectual affinity, recognized and superbly described, one must truly believe that the ideal of political life consists in discussing, not only in the legislative body but also among the entire population, if human society will transform itself into a monstrous club, and if truth will emerge automatically through voting.