Schmitt, Christianity, and Schmittians
Because of the recent popularity of Adrian Vermeule, I have engaged with what we may call ‘modern Schmittianism’ among so-called Catholic integralists a number of times since I started this Substack.
Recently, I taught Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political in George Schwab’s translation (in the revised 2007 edition). Alerted to Vermeule’s appropriation (and Heinrich Meier’s controversial interpretation) of Schmitt, I also considered The Concept of the Political as an intervention in Christian thought along four explicit dimensions.
First, it explicitly goes against the (let’s call it) Pacifist interpretation of Christianity. (Some other time I’ll discuss Anscombe’s version of this argument.) The very idea that one ought to love one’s enemy is limited to those who are fellow religionists/fellow nationals or friends (see p. 29). In fact, crucial to Schmitt’s argument is that he draws the contrast in terms of public enemies (or hostis) and private enemies (inimicus; see pp. 28-29; 47-51). The latter being among fellow citizens, the former being among different authoritative groups.
Sometimes Schmitt articulates this distinction or contrast in terms of one between natural enemies and artificial enemies (p. 29). In so doing he explicitly (see note 9 on p. 28) echoes Socrates’ version of a distinction like this at Republic 470. This matters because there Socrates insists that enmity among Hellenes is a kind of mistake (or artificial) whereas the barbarians are natural enemies based on language and ethnicity. So, lurking in Schmitt is an idea that some enemies are enemies in virtue of not just an existential choice but also in terms of national or ethnic destiny.
Second, as the previous paragraph suggests, there is a larger understanding of history here. His distinction, is, in fact, inscribed in an account of the ‘providential enemy’ [or Satan] (pp. 67-68), where there is no real choice in the matter if you think that history itself has a meaning. Schmitt’s own views are not fully explicit here because he quotes Cromwell (and Genesis III: I5) to this effect. But most commentators are inclined to ascribe this material to Schmitt’s own views.
Third, the reason for this is that, in fact, Schmitt explicitly treats de-politicizing approaches (such as liberalism) as forms of “devilry.” (p. 66) In fact, this has four elements: (i) Schmitt rejects ‘security’ as an aim of statecraft (65); (ii) he treats this aim as characteristic of the bourgeois minds (p. 62 linking it to the desire of total security). Sometimes (iii) Schmitt rejects wider projects committed to “peace, security, and harmony” (pp. 65-66). Finally, as Leo Strauss emphasizes, Schmitt has an evident distaste of entertainment (p. 53).
Fourth, Schmitt rejects the whole traditional framework of just war theory. This is not immediately evident because he often sounds like a conservative (say Anscombe) who warns against the excessive moralization of modern humanitarianism as leading to genocidal wars. And one might thinj, thus, he is in favor of something like ius gentium. But I have two kinds of evidence for Schmitt’s rejection of just war theory. First, he explicitly says so:
That justice does not belong to the concept of war has been generally recognized since Grotius. The notions which postulate a just war usually serve a political purpose. To demand of a politically united people that it wage war for a just cause only is either something self-evident, if it means that war can be risked only against a real enemy, or it is a hidden political aspiration of some other party to wrest from the state its jus belli and to find norms of justice whose content and application in the concrete case is not decided upon by the state but by another party, and thereby it determines who the enemy is. (p. 49)
The natural reading of this is that when it is not tautological, just war theory is an instrument of corruption even usurpation. It undermines the true sovereign, and shifts authority to “another party.” And Schmitt is absolutely explicit that outsiders cannot judge, for epistemic and intrinsic reasons, who the enemy really is. As he puts it:
Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.—p. 27
Undoubtedly, others who are more learned in Christian theology and political thought may find in Schmitt other interventions worth noting. But in so far as Vermeule presents himself as a Schmittian, it’s worth asking if he really believes that liberalism is a manifestation of devilry, and how he views just war theory.
So much for my present understanding. Now, in engaging with (recall) Pierre Manent’s (more generous and more humane) Schmittianism, I had offered a schematic characterization of defining features of Schmittian political theology. I had described seven features:
Providentialism. There is a clear commitment to God’s general and particular providence. In particular, our actions unfold in a larger history that is actualizing God's plan (that’s the general providence). In addition, God may well have goals for us as individuals. Some of us have a special role to play in advancing this general plan, and (since we act in conditions of radical uncertainty) will be called to make existential decisions.
Sincere Faith. I didn’t mention miracles in the previous entry, but these may well be part of God’s agency. The crucial point is that philosophy or reason cannot conquer faith (for reasons familiar from Bayle, Hume, or Kant), and so it is foundational.
The authority of Revelation. In particular, that Jesus is the Christ, and that the coming of the antichrist is a necessary step toward the second coming of Christ.
Political theology in a twofold sense: first, that many political concepts and practices are secularized Christian concepts and practices (and so a way in which the antichrist gains strength). Second, the ultimate authority of theology in politics. It is, of course, tempting to treat the first sense as descriptive and the second as normative, but that misses the eschatological role of the first by which one may well advance the second.
Catholic, but with an uneasy relationship to papal authority (and Augustine’s rejection of political theology).
The friend-enemy distinction is foundational. There is no turning the cheek to the providential enemy. This also means political life is risky. (In fact, the Antichrist promises 'peace and security.’) The enemy is the other, the Stranger.
Original sin. Crucially this means man is incapable of anarchism, and so must be ruled.
That is, I had previously missed the significance of Schmitt’s rejection of just war theory and the fact that he treats his critique of liberal/humanitarian depoliticization in eschatological terms (even if it is lurking in 3).
For many, the danger of modern integralism is its intolerance to minorities. But I suspect the even larger world historical danger is that Schmittian integralists may well see majorities as advancing the work of the devil.