In “War as an Institution,” Bertrand Russell praises William James’ “admirable address on “The Moral Equivalent of War,” delivered to a congress of pacifists during the Spanish-American War of 1898.” While writing during World War I, Russell, who knew James personally, presumably identifies with James’ protest at American imperialism.
For Russell, “pacifism, if it is to be both victorious and beneficent, must find an outlet, compatible with humane feeling, for the vigor which now leads nations into war and destruction.” Russell credits James with this way of formulating the intellectual challenge to pacifism (although Russell can’t endorse James’ solution).
Russell is right that James is alert to this challenge to pacifism, but after reading James’ essay it is clear that in James this is downstream from a diagnosis of two fears that motivate the anti-pacifist (or militarist) position.* Perhaps, ‘fears’ is the wrong term here; James himself conveys the fears as “two unwillingnesses of the [anti-pacifist] imagination.” Here’s how these unwillingnesses are characterized by James on behalf of the anti-pacifist:
In wider context James leaves the destructiveness of war (which motivates the pacifist) aside because he correctly discerns that the militarist thinks that the costs of war are worth it. When I read the quoted passage for the first time, I thought James was offering an aesthetic and moral reason for the militarist to reject pacifism. But, upon reflection, I now think James is offering two considerations in which ethical and aesthetic characteristics are intertwined. My reason for that is that in both (‘first…secondly’) an aesthetic feature is highlighted (‘charm…thrillingly…tragically…supreme theatre’).
James is right to think that aesthetic considerations play a non-trivial role in the rejection of pacifism. This is hard to believe now, because in general aesthetics is downplayed in contemporary political philosophy and (as a symptom of this) in our time the rejection of pacificism (even by people who would never self-describe as pro-war) is usually couched in terms of right or just war theory.
As an aside, in a fascinating guest post, “The Harold Rosenberg School of Historical Cosplay,” (here) at
’s The Hinternet, (previously unfamiliar to me) articulates how one might conceptualize one such aesthetic element, the “dramaturgical dimension of politics —its cosplay quality.” Crucially rather than seeing cosplay as a kind of make-belief, Blake Smith argues “it is life and politics.” Without wishing to go that far, there is more than a grain of truth in this. And recognition of the significance of the aesthetic in political life helps explain my growing impatience with a one-sided focus on moral issues in contemporary political theory.Be that as it may, notice that in James’ description what the militarist wants to rehabilitate is a kind of agency. And what the militarist rejects is the authority of impersonal social forces or change (‘evolution’) and a kind of diminution of human character. What James reveals, then, is that the anti-pacifist rejects those features of modern life that leave us socially alienated without control of our destiny. I mention this because as I noted yesterday (here), Russell’s progressive political theory is itself animated not by distributive issues, but rather by a desire to combat such social alienation.**
Now, James himself “devoutly believe[s] in the reign of peace and in the gradual advent of some sort of socialistic equilibrium.” But he wants to meet the militarist on his own grounds. And so James proposes a kind of civilian analogue to the military life, that is, an expansive program of (what we would now call) national service, which is supposed to show that “the martial type of character can be bred without war.” And he couches this program in militaristic terms (“conscription;” the “immemorial human warfare against nature” etc.) He basically treats the national service as an induction into the life of the “barrack.” And so (anticipating) Russell (but also the Burkean conversative who emphasizes little platoons) aims to recover individual and collective agency through social service.
That’s all I wanted to say here. But let me add two observations: first, James’ (and Russell’s) versions of pacifism are not expressed in terms of religion or even secular religion of the sanctity of life. (Of course, they care about it.) But rather in thinking about social life as a complex and dynamically evolving whole in which individual and collective agency perpetually risks being swallowed by forces we can’t control.+ What are known as the martial virtues have to be re-directed, but not eliminated, to proper social ends and our let’s call them ‘public aesthetic’ needs are to be embraced.
Second, James repeatedly acknowledges the aesthetic attractions of the military life and wishes to align his socialism with these. I found this eye-opening. Because when in a subsequent generation neo-liberals attack socialism, they always imply that a socialist economy is a war-economy. I always assumed this was an effect of the embrace of social planning during the first World War. I still think that. But I now suspect that James’ argument, and its uptake, may also have something to do with it.
*There is an interesting question about the variety of anti-pacifisms, but let’s leave that aside.
**It is fascinating that quite a bit of literature on the emergence of fascism or so-called incels that diagnoses something like social alienation uses Arendt as a starting-point of discussion.
+By ‘evolving’ I really mean adapting to changing circumstances.