It’s fair to say that interest in Condorcet is limited to aficionados that can be divided in a small number of (partially overlapping) groups: formal philosophers and social choice theorists who can legitimately claim him as their founder, and some of whom continue to develop the
Isn't the fundamental problem with Condorcet the assumption that scientific progress and moral progress have the same ground, as expressed in, 'The sole foundation for belief in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general laws directing the phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, are necessary and constant. Why should this principle be any less true for the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than for the other operations of nature?' The answer to why this principle is not true is that intellectual and moral faculties depend on beliefs and there is no necessary or constant relationship between what is the case and what is believed to be the case. In particular, beliefs as to what is morally acceptable/required are beliefs based on conventions that function largely in virtue of a community wide belief that others will follow them. So a belief in objective morality has got to be based on principles quite different to belief in objective science. Actually, of course, the fact that humans don't follow necessary and constant moral laws is taken by many to show that there is no objective morality, we get to the many knowledges many truths doctrine that is rampant. The hard problem is to recover some conception of moral objectivity without succumbing to the claim that one's society has progressed to knowledge of universal moral truths that have the same objective ground as scientific truths.
I actually think that Condorcet goes off the rails in lots of places! I agree that his commitment to unity of virtues and to the link between moral and scientific (and economic and social) progress is not well supported.
Isn't the fundamental problem with Condorcet the assumption that scientific progress and moral progress have the same ground, as expressed in, 'The sole foundation for belief in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general laws directing the phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, are necessary and constant. Why should this principle be any less true for the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than for the other operations of nature?' The answer to why this principle is not true is that intellectual and moral faculties depend on beliefs and there is no necessary or constant relationship between what is the case and what is believed to be the case. In particular, beliefs as to what is morally acceptable/required are beliefs based on conventions that function largely in virtue of a community wide belief that others will follow them. So a belief in objective morality has got to be based on principles quite different to belief in objective science. Actually, of course, the fact that humans don't follow necessary and constant moral laws is taken by many to show that there is no objective morality, we get to the many knowledges many truths doctrine that is rampant. The hard problem is to recover some conception of moral objectivity without succumbing to the claim that one's society has progressed to knowledge of universal moral truths that have the same objective ground as scientific truths.
Hi Karen,
I actually think that Condorcet goes off the rails in lots of places! I agree that his commitment to unity of virtues and to the link between moral and scientific (and economic and social) progress is not well supported.