I have been asked (recall) to comment on a paper by Stephen Turner (USF) that is forthcoming in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 2024. Turner treats Feyerabend’s account of the coercive nature of science as a kind of (partial) anticipation of recent interest in testimonial injustice. In particular, according to Turner, for Feyerabend “the role of epistemic coercion in science and in society in general was intrinsic and ineliminable.” As
But the claim that epistemic coercion is intrinsic to science and society strikes me as too strong when offered as an interpretation of But the claim that epistemic coercion is intrinsic to science and society strikes me as too strong when offered as an interpretation of Feyerabend. After all one of the theses Feyerabend wishes to defend is: (VIII)
“…a free society will not be imposed but will emerge only where people solving particular problems in a spirit of collaboration introduce protective structures of the kind alluded to. Citizen initiatives on a small scale, collaboration between nations on a large scale are the developments I have in mind. (Science in a Free Society; p. 30 emphasis in original) After all one of the theses Feyerabend wishes to defend is: (VIII)
“…a free society will not be imposed but will emerge only where people solving particular problems in a spirit of collaboration introduce protective structures of the kind alluded to. Citizen initiatives on a small scale, collaboration between nations on a large scale are the developments I have in mind. (Science in a Free Society; p. 30 emphasis in original)
Adam Smith's model of society as an emergent order based on the rules fashioned and followed by ordinary people, included at least some scientists. Feyerbend's paper had a liberating influence on my methodolgical musing at a critical time in my development.
What I learned at the time was that you have to examine what scientists do, not what they say, to better/properly evaluate them.
But the claim that epistemic coercion is intrinsic to science and society strikes me as too strong when offered as an interpretation of But the claim that epistemic coercion is intrinsic to science and society strikes me as too strong when offered as an interpretation of Feyerabend. After all one of the theses Feyerabend wishes to defend is: (VIII)
“…a free society will not be imposed but will emerge only where people solving particular problems in a spirit of collaboration introduce protective structures of the kind alluded to. Citizen initiatives on a small scale, collaboration between nations on a large scale are the developments I have in mind. (Science in a Free Society; p. 30 emphasis in original) After all one of the theses Feyerabend wishes to defend is: (VIII)
“…a free society will not be imposed but will emerge only where people solving particular problems in a spirit of collaboration introduce protective structures of the kind alluded to. Citizen initiatives on a small scale, collaboration between nations on a large scale are the developments I have in mind. (Science in a Free Society; p. 30 emphasis in original)
Adam Smith's model of society as an emergent order based on the rules fashioned and followed by ordinary people, included at least some scientists. Feyerbend's paper had a liberating influence on my methodolgical musing at a critical time in my development.
What I learned at the time was that you have to examine what scientists do, not what they say, to better/properly evaluate them.
I had no idea that Feyerabend influenced you. Fascinating.