Silence or assent seem to be the only legitimate response(s) to a sound argument. I have always found it peculiar that silence or agreement should be the internal goal of philosophy. And I remember with fondness from my graduate school days the manner by which the best logicians would manage to circumvent this: when confronted with a sound argument they couldn’t refute, but evidently didn’t like, they would say with great care, even aplomb, “I don’t find that [argument] interesting.” And lurking there would be an aesthetic sense that could, somehow (not if I tried it, of course) shift the terms of the discussion altogether. (Of course, this could result in a higher order stalemate of conflicting ‘that’s un-interesting.’)
This was a bit too complex for me, but my position is simple. The real choice is between the view that objective truth is what matters (even if our understanding of it is inevitably partial and fallible) and the view that everyone can have their own truth. The latter viewpoint leads, in very short order, to Orwell's analysis of totalitarianism: truth is what the people in power say it is. That seems to me pretty much where Foucault and his followers ended up.
This was a bit too complex for me, but my position is simple. The real choice is between the view that objective truth is what matters (even if our understanding of it is inevitably partial and fallible) and the view that everyone can have their own truth. The latter viewpoint leads, in very short order, to Orwell's analysis of totalitarianism: truth is what the people in power say it is. That seems to me pretty much where Foucault and his followers ended up.