In an important (2018) paper, “John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism” (The Historical Journal) by John Stanton it is (correctly) suggested that Locke’s status as the father of liberalism is a twentieth century backward projection and a fable. As regular readers know, I think that’s right. (I am working on a paper with John Thrasher at Chapman to explain the significance of this.) On my reading of the trajectory of liberalism, liberalism gets invented in the late eighteenth century — by Robertson, Smith, Bentham, and Constant, who all use ‘liberal’ in a modern way as well as Humboldt and Kant, who do not — as a response to the mercantile imperialism of Locke and his followers. Rather than re-telling my story here, I engage with the details of Stanton’s argument, which also leaves something desired.
This is fascinating, and of course I lack your expertise in the history of thought. Still, I prefer a reading where 18th-19th century liberalism has two main strands, one (mostly British/European) running through Smith and Bentham and with Mill as its leading exponent and the other (mostly American), from Locke through Jefferson and Calhoun to the Lochner Court. In the 20th century, these turn into social democracy/democratic socialism (mostly called liberalism in the US) on the one side and free-market conservatism/propertianism on the other.
You are not alone in discerning two competing streams in liberalism. Some follow Rawls in contrasting the social contract with utilitarianism. Other follow Foucault in contrasting a radical strain running from Hume through Bentham to Chicago economics, and a rights based strain running from Rousseau and Kant to ordoliberalism. Your version is the first I heard of it. I don't tend to think of Jefferson or Calhoun as liberals in any sense, I must say. But will think about it.
It seems very strange to see the Chicago School as the descendants of Bentham, at least assuming you place JS Mill in the line of succession. Rawls' distinction between utilitarian/consequentialist liberalsim and the social contract line (which has to start from Locke) is about right, though Rawls gets the political/economic implications totally wrong
But if you divide liberals into European ordoliberals and Chicago neoliberals, there seems to be no room left for Mill and his successors, including social democrats/democratic socialists.
This reflects a broader problem I have when liberalism, ranging from Rawls to Hayek, is contrasted with "the left", taken to be Marxist (and, at least implicitly, Leninist). The left in this sense was always a tiny minority of socialist and social democratic thinking in the Anglospere and has now disappeared almost entirely.
As I write here, I see the left as encompassing "anyone critical of the current economic and social order on the grounds that is unfair, unequal and environmentally destructive", particularly including old-style US liberals.
Interesting, thank you Eric. Let me add some thoughts.
A few years ago, when I read the Second Treatise, I perceived it to be rather Smithian liberal, in the sense of promoting a presumption of liberty ("allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice" WN).
The location of that promotion is in THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS of the social contract. And the existence of the promotion in the terms and conditions is somewhat tacit (as I recall). Locke, on my inexpert reading, is saying the terms and conditions specify the promotion of the general good, and Locke seems to be proceeding on a presupposition that we all know in the bottom of our hearts that the best way to advance the general good is to uphold a Smithian-liberal presumption of liberty, since we all know that the governmentalization of social affairs is not always but generally a sham and a menace. Perhaps Locke acts like we all know these things about what serves the general good as a way insinuating those things. If so, he is rightly seen as a promoter of Smithian-liberal sensibilities.
Thus, Locke sees the Smithian-liberal presumption as being — practically, if not explicitly — in the terms and conditions. The terms and conditions of Locke's idea of social contract entail, in effect, the Smithian-liberal presumption.
Now, I do realize that Locke understands that the terms and conditions cannot specify a strict hewing to the liberty principle. I read him as saying that the terms and conditions are for the government to support what I've called "overall liberty," which is not positive liberty, but rather favor for arrangements whose OVERALL effect is augmented negative liberty. There can be disagreement between direct and overall liberty, but usually they agree.
I tend to interpret Hume as seeing that the mere idea of social contract does not necessarily carry those Smithian-liberal terms and conditions. The Smithian-liberal fine print gets lost or suppressed — as subsequent history stupendously demonstrates. I think that is part of why Hume sees social contract as a dangerous idea—it is part of why I see it as a dangerous idea.
I hypothesize that favor for social contract found in Grotius, Selden, Hobbes, and Pufendorf might be seen as their looking to emphasize the obligation on the citizen's side of the notional contract ("C'mon people, you signed up for this, so settled down and let's have peace and prosperity"), whereas Locke and then Paine et al emphasized the citizen's right to resist and rebel once terms and conditions on the other side of the contract ("Those bastards broke the contract!").
Correction to the final words of my comment: It should read:
whereas Locke and then Paine et al emphasized the citizen's right to resist and rebel once terms and conditions on the other side of the contract have been sufficiently violated ("Those bastards broke the contract!").
Very interesting stuff! If you can find the passage that suggests the promoting a presumption of liberty, I would be very interested. (This presumption is also very important to my own reading of Smith.) I actually think Locke is the source of the Humean and Smithian account of convention. (I just published a paper on this.) So I am open to the idea that Locke is a real source for their social theory, despite the fact that I think Hume and Smith are very critical of Locke's account of social contract and Locke's mercantilism.
Eric, Here are Locke Second Treatise passages that, to me, suggest overall-liberty as an overarching term/condition. I have copy/pasted from OLL text, but the page references are to the blue CUP Two Treatises edited by Laslett. The text at OLL is a bit different than in the Laslett volume. Also, when pasting here, any of Locke's italicization has been lost:
and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. (324)
for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise… (326) [This significant because that’s all he seems to see what govt is for.]
whereas government has no other end but the preservation of property (329)
This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. (350)
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. (353)
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never* have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it. (357-58)
This is fascinating, and of course I lack your expertise in the history of thought. Still, I prefer a reading where 18th-19th century liberalism has two main strands, one (mostly British/European) running through Smith and Bentham and with Mill as its leading exponent and the other (mostly American), from Locke through Jefferson and Calhoun to the Lochner Court. In the 20th century, these turn into social democracy/democratic socialism (mostly called liberalism in the US) on the one side and free-market conservatism/propertianism on the other.
You are not alone in discerning two competing streams in liberalism. Some follow Rawls in contrasting the social contract with utilitarianism. Other follow Foucault in contrasting a radical strain running from Hume through Bentham to Chicago economics, and a rights based strain running from Rousseau and Kant to ordoliberalism. Your version is the first I heard of it. I don't tend to think of Jefferson or Calhoun as liberals in any sense, I must say. But will think about it.
It seems very strange to see the Chicago School as the descendants of Bentham, at least assuming you place JS Mill in the line of succession. Rawls' distinction between utilitarian/consequentialist liberalsim and the social contract line (which has to start from Locke) is about right, though Rawls gets the political/economic implications totally wrong
But if you divide liberals into European ordoliberals and Chicago neoliberals, there seems to be no room left for Mill and his successors, including social democrats/democratic socialists.
This reflects a broader problem I have when liberalism, ranging from Rawls to Hayek, is contrasted with "the left", taken to be Marxist (and, at least implicitly, Leninist). The left in this sense was always a tiny minority of socialist and social democratic thinking in the Anglospere and has now disappeared almost entirely.
As I write here, I see the left as encompassing "anyone critical of the current economic and social order on the grounds that is unfair, unequal and environmentally destructive", particularly including old-style US liberals.
https://johnquiggin.com/2016/03/03/the-three-party-system-crosspost-from-crooked-timber/
Interesting, thank you Eric. Let me add some thoughts.
A few years ago, when I read the Second Treatise, I perceived it to be rather Smithian liberal, in the sense of promoting a presumption of liberty ("allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice" WN).
The location of that promotion is in THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS of the social contract. And the existence of the promotion in the terms and conditions is somewhat tacit (as I recall). Locke, on my inexpert reading, is saying the terms and conditions specify the promotion of the general good, and Locke seems to be proceeding on a presupposition that we all know in the bottom of our hearts that the best way to advance the general good is to uphold a Smithian-liberal presumption of liberty, since we all know that the governmentalization of social affairs is not always but generally a sham and a menace. Perhaps Locke acts like we all know these things about what serves the general good as a way insinuating those things. If so, he is rightly seen as a promoter of Smithian-liberal sensibilities.
Thus, Locke sees the Smithian-liberal presumption as being — practically, if not explicitly — in the terms and conditions. The terms and conditions of Locke's idea of social contract entail, in effect, the Smithian-liberal presumption.
Now, I do realize that Locke understands that the terms and conditions cannot specify a strict hewing to the liberty principle. I read him as saying that the terms and conditions are for the government to support what I've called "overall liberty," which is not positive liberty, but rather favor for arrangements whose OVERALL effect is augmented negative liberty. There can be disagreement between direct and overall liberty, but usually they agree.
I tend to interpret Hume as seeing that the mere idea of social contract does not necessarily carry those Smithian-liberal terms and conditions. The Smithian-liberal fine print gets lost or suppressed — as subsequent history stupendously demonstrates. I think that is part of why Hume sees social contract as a dangerous idea—it is part of why I see it as a dangerous idea.
I hypothesize that favor for social contract found in Grotius, Selden, Hobbes, and Pufendorf might be seen as their looking to emphasize the obligation on the citizen's side of the notional contract ("C'mon people, you signed up for this, so settled down and let's have peace and prosperity"), whereas Locke and then Paine et al emphasized the citizen's right to resist and rebel once terms and conditions on the other side of the contract ("Those bastards broke the contract!").
Correction to the final words of my comment: It should read:
whereas Locke and then Paine et al emphasized the citizen's right to resist and rebel once terms and conditions on the other side of the contract have been sufficiently violated ("Those bastards broke the contract!").
Hi Dan,
Very interesting stuff! If you can find the passage that suggests the promoting a presumption of liberty, I would be very interested. (This presumption is also very important to my own reading of Smith.) I actually think Locke is the source of the Humean and Smithian account of convention. (I just published a paper on this.) So I am open to the idea that Locke is a real source for their social theory, despite the fact that I think Hume and Smith are very critical of Locke's account of social contract and Locke's mercantilism.
Eric, Here are Locke Second Treatise passages that, to me, suggest overall-liberty as an overarching term/condition. I have copy/pasted from OLL text, but the page references are to the blue CUP Two Treatises edited by Laslett. The text at OLL is a bit different than in the Laslett volume. Also, when pasting here, any of Locke's italicization has been lost:
and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. (324)
for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise… (326) [This significant because that’s all he seems to see what govt is for.]
whereas government has no other end but the preservation of property (329)
This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. (350)
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. (353)
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never* have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it. (357-58)