Machiavellian Zionism

Despite the relative wide readership of my three most recent essays (here; here; here) on the Israeli/Hamas/Palestinian conflict, I have been hesitant to speak my mind on it while the fighting has been unfolding. This is not just due to my aversion to contribute (on the minimal margin) to some side in the various propaganda wars, nor just my recoiling of the tendency among my peers to isolate moral and legal considerations from political ones or, thereby, to engage in psychodrama (in the sense Liam Kofi Bright has made famous); but primarily because I tend to emphasize the limitation of philosophical speech when bullets are flying.

I am writing this post after the start of a four day ceasefire that should involve release and exchange of hostages and prisoners. As regular readers know, I write from a Zionist perspective, albeit rather critical of the long term strategy of Zionism. The following two paragraphs repeat ideas (with minor variations) I have articulated before and so if you are a very regular reader feel free to skip these.

Contemporary Zionism (as represented by the State of Israel) has seven structural and longstanding weaknesses, which I separate for analytic purposes (although in practice they are intertwined in complex ways): i) the failure to establish permanent borders for the state of Israel; (ii) the inability to settle what kind of political entity Israel should be so that it can end its near-permanent war-footing and settler occupation of hostile populations; (iii) (the perception of) Israel's dependence on America's political and military support, which ties Israel to America's strategic interests and electoral politics, while (iv) allowing a split between the interests of Zionism and exile populations to develop; (v) Israel’s failure to provide Palestinians with positive incentives and symbolic declarations to come to peace with Israel.

After October 7, we can add two broader strategic disasters: (vi) leading Israelis evidently came to believe their own myths about Palestinian irrelevance. This is most evident in Israel’s focus on checking Iran’s influence in the Caucasus and pursuing the Abraham accords. (vii) Israel has backed itself into a corner, where it encourages ever more spectacular violence against it without any end in sight, and where attempts to reverse the cycle of repression will be felt and perceived as weakness.

I described (vii) as an Israeli cul-de-sac in past posts. Here I would like to tackle it head on. First, I reject the idea often articulated by pundits and commentators that ‘violence’ does ‘not work.’ This is a very odd claim to make by all involved: let me offer some examples from living memory (if you are of a certain age) that are now somewhat uncontroversial: in between 1994-95, a series of violence (the murder of Rabin, the 1994 massacres in Hebron, the Hamas suicides) helped derail the Oslo process (as intended). More distantly, Egypt’s (1973) surprise attack on Israel eventually helped it recover the Sinai (etc.)*

Second, (vii) is arguably caused by elements described under (i)-(ii)-(v). In particular, Israel’s use of violence is generally not guided by any overall political strategy, but reactive or tactical. We see this often in its officials’ willingness to describe the use of violence in terms of ‘restoring deterrence,’ ‘creating a buffer zone,’ or, in the present conflict, ‘the destruction of Hamas.’ (We also often hear that ‘they’ only ‘understand’ violence, without reflection on how this message is understood.)

As an aside, I realize that certain critics of Zionism would disagree with the previous paragraph: they often treat it as an expansive/maximalist (even genocidal) colonial project that is guided by the desire to eliminate Palestinians from the whole Palestine area of the British mandate (that is, west of the Jordan river). I have partially responded to the framing by the critics’ of Zionism in some of the posts linked above (especially this one and this one).+ But note also, and I say this to Zionists and Zionism’s friends, that the critics cannot, even in principle, be fully refuted in virtue of (recall (i-ii, v) above) the strategic ambiguity that Israel has embraced (often in order to reconcile domestic coalition politics and relations with the US and, more recently, its diplomacy to complete the Abrahamic accords). To put it straightforwardly, the strategic ambiguity about Zionism’s end-game itself facilitates, fairly or not (and I think unfairly), the colonist/genocidal narrative.

Third, when it comes to these issues, I find Machiavellianism helpful in articulating how we should reflect on policy options in the aftermath of political violence. I do so partially for tactical purposes because nobody can accuse Machiavellianism of naivete or of normative/utopian delusions. I also do it because I happen to agree with the underlying insight. I quote Burnham’s usefully succinct summary (1943):

How should states proceed, if they are to proceed, treatment of enemies, internal or external, once enemies have been defeated?…[Machiavelli] shows that the "middle way" in such cases almost 'invariably works out badly; that the enemy should be either completely crushed or completely conciliated, that a mixture of the two simply guarantees both the continuation of a cause for resentment and revenge and the possibility for later translating these into action.—(The Machiavellians: defenders of freedom, p 43)

While there are sectors among Zionism who would opt for complete crushing of the Palestinian cause, this is not a viable option now, if it ever was (after 1948). Notice that the purported crushing of Hamas falls well short of crushing the Palestinian cause. If anything, by making the invasion of Gaza about crushing Hamas, Israel itself took the Palestinian cause more generally — wisely, I hasten to add! — off the table.

So, if complete crushing is off the table then muddling through and complete conciliation with the Palestinian cause are the remaining options. Problem is that muddling through has led to Israel’s (and Hamas’) cul-de-sacs. This cul-de-sac has been beneficial to some strategic actors (settlers, businesses that benefit from defense spending pertaining to the occupation, Palestinian smugglers and rejectionists, etc.), but politically it remains a dead end (that is, it generates “the continuation of a cause for resentment and revenge”).

As I have said before, Israel can create a lot of nontrivial signals that can put complete conciliation back on the agenda without, initially, significant downside risk or tackling domestic political opposition to any peace process and some of the very painful decisions a final settlement would entail. Here are a few examples (some familiar from previous posts): first, Israeli governments can express an unambiguous commitment to compensation of individual Palestinian refugees (going back to 1948) with forthright admission that this is long overdue and to start paying out regardless of a final settlement and without conceding a right to return. Justice demands it, and it is an important signal that Israel doesn’t think force is the only tool of statecraft it ever takes seriously and that it is willing to treat individual Palestinians with dignity.

Second, Israel should end its blockade (together with Egypt) of Gaza’s trade with the rest of the world. (One can carve out modest security exceptions on some goods.) It should encourage the enrichment of Palestinians; this would signal that Zionism can imagine a prosperous Palestinian cause. If one does not share my hope for the political salience as a means toward conciliation of this, remember the strategy of collective impoverishment has been a colossal failure (and own goal, since Palestinians could be a more important export market).

Third, Israel has amazing medical technologies and educational institutions. In light of the damage to Palestinian medical facilities and personnel, a generous program of medical and public health rebuilding/subsidies and medical training/fellowships would also signal that Palestinian life (and public health) is valued. Obviously, it’s up to Palestinians to accept such a program.

I am very aware that many Israelis feel a mixture of vengeance, vulnerability, fear, and mourning since October 7. If my conversations with those known to me are any evidence, there is very little appetite to be generous or contemplate complete conciliation toward Palestinians. And perhaps such steps, or any like them, should await the final hostage exchange and/or the end of the current round of hostilities in Gaza. Such steps certainly do not provide the framework for a political solution. But they are a necessary step toward it.

+Some other time I will explore in more depth the role of colonial projects within decolonial political projects in more comparative fashion.

*I tend to view the Israeli assault on Gaza City as analogous to the Russian battles for Grozny, including in the inability or unwillingness to avoid massive civilian casualties. The second of these battles did generate an outcome that significantly suppressed violent opposition to Russia rule in Chechnya.