Despite the relative wide readership of my three most recent essays (here; here; here) on the Israeli/Hamas/Palestinian conflict, I have been hesitant to speak my mind on it while the fighting has been unfolding. This is not just due to my aversion to contribute (on the minimal margin) to some side in the various propaganda wars, nor just my recoiling of the tendency among my peers to isolate moral and legal considerations from political ones or, thereby, to engage in
I don't think your examples are strong evidence against the proposition that violence doesn't work. As regards Egypt in 1973, they only got back what they had lost in 1967.
Assassinations and terror attacks certainly work to start or perpetuate wars, but that's a self-refuting claim given that wars rarely produce good outcomes for either side.
In the case of Israel/Palestine, both (all) sides have relied almost entirely on violence for 75 years, and the situation is worse than ever.
First, Israel and Palestinians have had worse conflicts. (Look up the number of deaths and displaced in the Israeli war of independence.)
Second, maybe economically wars are bad for all sides (I am happy to defer to your expertise), but it's not true otherwise. There is all kinds of political science research that shows the utility of violence in certain contexts. This is by no means an endorsement of the use of it in any conflict, but if you can't see the utility of it to strategic actors you will always be surprised.
Third, I don't think it's right to say that (both/all) sides have relied almost entirely on violence for 75 years, although I do agree that the violence has been often quite pointless.
The pol sci research I've seen in this vein tends to assume the utility of violence rather than showing it. It's trivially true that the providers of violence (military-industrial complexes, successful warlords and so on) benefit from it, but this is at the expense of their own societies. That's true in spades for claims for economic benefits from military strength (defending shipping lanes, exerting nebulous influence etc).
Can you point me to the research you have in mind?
I don't think your examples are strong evidence against the proposition that violence doesn't work. As regards Egypt in 1973, they only got back what they had lost in 1967.
Assassinations and terror attacks certainly work to start or perpetuate wars, but that's a self-refuting claim given that wars rarely produce good outcomes for either side.
In the case of Israel/Palestine, both (all) sides have relied almost entirely on violence for 75 years, and the situation is worse than ever.
First, Israel and Palestinians have had worse conflicts. (Look up the number of deaths and displaced in the Israeli war of independence.)
Second, maybe economically wars are bad for all sides (I am happy to defer to your expertise), but it's not true otherwise. There is all kinds of political science research that shows the utility of violence in certain contexts. This is by no means an endorsement of the use of it in any conflict, but if you can't see the utility of it to strategic actors you will always be surprised.
Third, I don't think it's right to say that (both/all) sides have relied almost entirely on violence for 75 years, although I do agree that the violence has been often quite pointless.
The pol sci research I've seen in this vein tends to assume the utility of violence rather than showing it. It's trivially true that the providers of violence (military-industrial complexes, successful warlords and so on) benefit from it, but this is at the expense of their own societies. That's true in spades for claims for economic benefits from military strength (defending shipping lanes, exerting nebulous influence etc).
Can you point me to the research you have in mind?