Last week (recall) I published a digression on The Philosophy of Hope: Beatitude in Spinoza (2024, Routledge) by Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews). As I said the book is a banger: it combines moral psychology, comparative theorizing (Spinozism and Daoism), and reception of Spinoza all in the service of a contextually sensitive interpretation of Spinoza. In it I was critical of Douglas’ general strategy to treat Spinoza’s doctrine of beatitude as a kind of escape from (Spinoza’s version of) The Fall. But as I granted at the end of that post, I left Douglas’ account of Spinoza’s views on beatitude untouched.
On Douglas on Beatitude in Spinoza, part II
On Douglas on Beatitude in Spinoza, part II
On Douglas on Beatitude in Spinoza, part II
Last week (recall) I published a digression on The Philosophy of Hope: Beatitude in Spinoza (2024, Routledge) by Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews). As I said the book is a banger: it combines moral psychology, comparative theorizing (Spinozism and Daoism), and reception of Spinoza all in the service of a contextually sensitive interpretation of Spinoza. In it I was critical of Douglas’ general strategy to treat Spinoza’s doctrine of beatitude as a kind of escape from (Spinoza’s version of) The Fall. But as I granted at the end of that post, I left Douglas’ account of Spinoza’s views on beatitude untouched.