On Hobson on the Ideologies of the New Imperialism
I am (recall; and here) re-reading J.A. Hobson’s (1902) Imperialism: A Study. (My page-numbers are to the American edition.) The book is organized around an implied distinction between the old imperialism and the new imperialism (which is really Hobson’s topic). He treats the older imperialism as a kind of benign “internationalism” in which a hegemonic power creates a kind of federation in which an accessible form of citizenship is spread through the empire. This generates a kind of cosmopolitan ideal of civilization (which lives on in, say, the EU).
The old imperialism is essentially romanticized by Hobson at first. I put it like that because as the argument unfolds it becomes clear that for Hobson older empires are also intrinsically “parasitic” on conquered peoples (p. 206; p. 242, etc.). And, in fact, Hobson worries that the new imperialism will emulate the old in this bad way.
The new imperialism is not benign in structure, and it has two important deviations from the older ideal: first, it is competitive in character because it is adopted “by several nations” at once. And the existence of “competing empires” at the same time is treated as “essentially modern.” (p. 6) These empires are “natural necessary enemies.” (p. 10) War is always lurking. Second, the modern “aggressive” imperial system rules over peoples that, absent absorption or genocide, are turned into a resentful and “dangerous nationalism.” (p. 10)
In my most previous post on Hobson, I already noted that Hobson's explanation of the inner logic of the new, more aggressive imperialism is rooted in a kind of “conspiracy” (p. 365) against the public. In fact, Hobson develops his point by way of an analysis of the logic of collective action. Let me quote a key passage from chapter IV (part 1):
But careful analysis of the existing relations between business and politics shows that the aggressive Imperialism which we seek to understand is not in the main the product of blind passions of races or of the mixed folly and ambition of politicians. It is far more rational than at first sight appears. Irrational from the standpoint of the whole nation, it is rational enough from the standpoint of certain classes in the nation. A completely socialist State which kept good books and presented regular balance-sheets of expenditure and assets would soon discard Imperialism; an intelligent laissez-faire democracy which gave duly proportionate weight in its policy to all economic interests alike would do the same. But a State in which certain well-organised business interests are able to outweigh the weak, diffused interest of the community is bound to pursue a policy which accords with the pressure of the former interests. (pp. 52-3)
Successful and sustained rent-seeking is the effect of organization of a small group at the expense of the many. And, as Hobson implies, it relies on lack of transparency and favoritism. The former is aided by control of the press (a topic that Hobson is quite exercised by), the latter is aided by lack of a full democratic franchise in the imperial homeland. So, it is no surprise that in his conclusion, Hobson advocates for expansion of the franchise in Brittain.
Of course, Hobson does not ignore the ideological support for the ‘new’ imperialism. Since competition among imperial powers is intrinsic to it, the ‘scientific’ defense of it rests on the “maintenance of a military and industrial struggle for life and wealth among nations” which enhances “the vigour and social efficiency of the several competitors, and so to furnish a natural process of selection, which shall give an ever larger and intenser control over the government and the economic exploitation of the world into the hands of the nation or nations representing the highest standard of civilisation or social efficiency, and by the elimination or subjugation of the inefficient shall raise the standard of the government of humanity.” (pp. 170-171; chapter II of Part II) This is the view he associates with Pearson, Van Dyke Robinson, and other scientific luminaries of the age,
Hobson’s response to this position is to decry the archaic methods of selection exhibited in modern imperialism. And, instead he proposes “rational” methods of “selection” on a grand scale by a “federation of European states, and finally…a world-federation” (p.174; see also p. 204). In particular, Hobson denies that under modern conditions, war selects in the right way, and he argues that by “equalising opportunities,” state socialism generates true competition at a higher plane. (p. 183) What Hobson means by ‘state socialism,’ is what we would call a kind of ‘welfare state with an open economy’ in which free trade and competition are complemented by state action. For, Hobson true selection should not operate anymore by “guns and tariffs” but through competition with “feelings and ideas.” (p. 196) Natural selection on genes is replaced, then, by natural selection on memes.
Regular readers know I am not at all enamored by these eugenic ideas. But lurking here is an interesting thought. That under modern conditions of social complexity there is not just one kind of social efficiency, but “there are many kinds of social efficiency.” (p. 198) And these are achieved not through one template of progress, but rather through the ability to control heterogeneous social environments and, thereby, to adapt to the physical environment. This presupposes complex social differentiation. This is, in sum, Hobson’s attempt to meet the Darwinian defense of the new imperialism and militarism on its own terms.
Before I wrap up. It is worth noting another ideological line of support for the new imperialism that Hobson diagnoses. And this reinforces his attempt to meet the Darwinian ideology of empire on its own class-based terms. This argument starts with the familiar fact of class interests supporting ideology. I quote:
Strikingly, on Hobson’s view the development of meritocracy has deepened the ideological support for imperialism. The reason for this is that by creating a meritocratic army (with the abolition of selling officer positions to highest bidder among a few aristocratic families) a wider class of people of diverse backgrounds could expect advancement in it and so partake in ‘glory and adventure.’ And this generates wider field of social support for empire.
In fact, meritocracy is served by empire in another way. By reducing the intensity of competition in the professions at home and by expanding opportunity abroad it creates quite a broad basis of support:
Long before Edward Said, then, Hobson noted that imperialism appealed to the class interest, and passions, of the educated. And we should understand his defense of a cosmopolitan, more pacific, world federalism as a means to attach the loyalty of this class to more noble ends (than might makes right) by requiring that it has plenty of jobs and programs for intellectual technicians.