In your summing up you still don't acknowledge the importance of Macaulay's Miltonian/Lockean democratic republicanism for the origins of both the American and French revolutions. Her histories, published between 1763 and 1769, were far more directly relevant for the Americans than either Rousseau or Kant, and the American example was extremely relevant for the French. So you lose the original (problematic) moral underpinning of eighteenth-century democratic thought by ignoring her. She was directly opposed to Hume.
Hume’s overall aim, in the Treatise, was to demonstrate that a science of morals is as available as is physical science. In neither case, he argued, was science a matter of discovering necessary connections among ideas. In both, the best that could be achieved was the discovery of regular connections between ideas, discovered by means of observation and inductive reasoning. This directed moral inquiry along the path of a science of society, a direction developed in far more detail by Adam Smith, in both his Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations. Smith’s attitude to science was more optimistic than Hume’s. The latter’s position, with regard to both physical and moral science, tended to be sceptical. In politics this scepticism led to conservatism, since the evidence of history was that it was dangerous to attempt to overturn established conventions. But, in writers like Condorcet, Smith’s optimism with regard to his capacity to reveal the workings of the economy, induced a faith that, ‘when enlightenment has attained a certain level in a number of nations’ and ‘commercial relations embrace the whole area of the globe … all will be the friends of humanity, all will work together for its perfection and its happiness.’ So Condorcet retains a belief in moral progress, but one that can't be sustained without something like Macaulay's theological underpinning. Kant, of course tried to reinstate it. Condorcet simply claimed that morality follows from human nature, which is highly implausible if one means by 'morality' objective moral truth, for, unless one believes that God has instituted an objective moral law, all the evidence is that human nature is compatible with the adoption of many moral beliefs. Condorcet reads what purports to be a science of economics, and so a description of observed tendencies, as containing a prophecy of moral progress. In Jane Marcet's Conversations on Political Economy one sees very clearly how Smith's 'science' gets read as an exposition of God's natural law. But if Hume is right there is no God, no immutable moral truth, no natural law, and the idea of moral progress is illusory. Smithian 'liberalism' ends up as being a strange perversion of the Miltonian/Lockean democratic republicanism, originally grounded in Christian providentialism, that buries its theological underpinning in a claim to scientific objectivity.
To simplify I don't think either the French or American revolution is liberal in character. I do agree with you that democratic republicanism is important to them.
If you mean by 'liberal in character' 'economically liberal in character' I agree, but they are liberal in character if what one means by 'liberal' is commitment to rule by law and the defence of certain political liberties, at least, habeas corpus, freedom of the press, and religious toleration. My point is that 'economic liberalism,' and libertarianism are completely at odds with the liberal democratic republicanism that was espoused during the eighteenth century. They have somehow highjacked the moral credentials of that earlier liberalism, without having any actual moral credentials. It is an independent question as to whether the moral credentials of the early liberal democratic republicanism were sound. But if one thinks that economic liberalism is good then one ought to supply it with an independent moral foundation, which it is not clear that it can supply.
First, the democratic republicanism of the eighteenth century has a rural bias, and is generally very uneasy with majoritarian, mass democracy. It's rather important to the American revolution, but in virtue of that it's also illiberal in all kinds of ways. I have no doubt that it influenced later views, but it influenced also by way of negation. I don't think there is any reason not to study democratic republicanism--it is important to this day. But it is also very distinct from liberalism even where it shapes it.
Second, liberalism originates in the late eighteenth century revolt against mercantilism and is developed as a response to the perceived limitations of both the French and American revolutions in order to grapple with democracy in mass society. This is already visible in Condorcet and Grouchy, but developed much more fully in Constant and Bentham both working with Smithian foundations. habeas corpus, freedom of the press, religious toleration, and a full franchise were often not effective anywhere until far into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries .
Third, 'economic liberalism' is not a correct characterization of the liberalism of Smith, Cobden, and Bright. It is a category that depoliticizes their views, and I doubt it is the effect of a serious engagement with their writings and speeches.
Excellent piece. Interesting that so many so-called classical liberals today revere Lord Acton, who supported the Confederacy and got every prediction wrong, and are silent on Bright. Ideology or ignorance, or both maybe.
In your summing up you still don't acknowledge the importance of Macaulay's Miltonian/Lockean democratic republicanism for the origins of both the American and French revolutions. Her histories, published between 1763 and 1769, were far more directly relevant for the Americans than either Rousseau or Kant, and the American example was extremely relevant for the French. So you lose the original (problematic) moral underpinning of eighteenth-century democratic thought by ignoring her. She was directly opposed to Hume.
Hume’s overall aim, in the Treatise, was to demonstrate that a science of morals is as available as is physical science. In neither case, he argued, was science a matter of discovering necessary connections among ideas. In both, the best that could be achieved was the discovery of regular connections between ideas, discovered by means of observation and inductive reasoning. This directed moral inquiry along the path of a science of society, a direction developed in far more detail by Adam Smith, in both his Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations. Smith’s attitude to science was more optimistic than Hume’s. The latter’s position, with regard to both physical and moral science, tended to be sceptical. In politics this scepticism led to conservatism, since the evidence of history was that it was dangerous to attempt to overturn established conventions. But, in writers like Condorcet, Smith’s optimism with regard to his capacity to reveal the workings of the economy, induced a faith that, ‘when enlightenment has attained a certain level in a number of nations’ and ‘commercial relations embrace the whole area of the globe … all will be the friends of humanity, all will work together for its perfection and its happiness.’ So Condorcet retains a belief in moral progress, but one that can't be sustained without something like Macaulay's theological underpinning. Kant, of course tried to reinstate it. Condorcet simply claimed that morality follows from human nature, which is highly implausible if one means by 'morality' objective moral truth, for, unless one believes that God has instituted an objective moral law, all the evidence is that human nature is compatible with the adoption of many moral beliefs. Condorcet reads what purports to be a science of economics, and so a description of observed tendencies, as containing a prophecy of moral progress. In Jane Marcet's Conversations on Political Economy one sees very clearly how Smith's 'science' gets read as an exposition of God's natural law. But if Hume is right there is no God, no immutable moral truth, no natural law, and the idea of moral progress is illusory. Smithian 'liberalism' ends up as being a strange perversion of the Miltonian/Lockean democratic republicanism, originally grounded in Christian providentialism, that buries its theological underpinning in a claim to scientific objectivity.
To simplify I don't think either the French or American revolution is liberal in character. I do agree with you that democratic republicanism is important to them.
If you mean by 'liberal in character' 'economically liberal in character' I agree, but they are liberal in character if what one means by 'liberal' is commitment to rule by law and the defence of certain political liberties, at least, habeas corpus, freedom of the press, and religious toleration. My point is that 'economic liberalism,' and libertarianism are completely at odds with the liberal democratic republicanism that was espoused during the eighteenth century. They have somehow highjacked the moral credentials of that earlier liberalism, without having any actual moral credentials. It is an independent question as to whether the moral credentials of the early liberal democratic republicanism were sound. But if one thinks that economic liberalism is good then one ought to supply it with an independent moral foundation, which it is not clear that it can supply.
First, the democratic republicanism of the eighteenth century has a rural bias, and is generally very uneasy with majoritarian, mass democracy. It's rather important to the American revolution, but in virtue of that it's also illiberal in all kinds of ways. I have no doubt that it influenced later views, but it influenced also by way of negation. I don't think there is any reason not to study democratic republicanism--it is important to this day. But it is also very distinct from liberalism even where it shapes it.
Second, liberalism originates in the late eighteenth century revolt against mercantilism and is developed as a response to the perceived limitations of both the French and American revolutions in order to grapple with democracy in mass society. This is already visible in Condorcet and Grouchy, but developed much more fully in Constant and Bentham both working with Smithian foundations. habeas corpus, freedom of the press, religious toleration, and a full franchise were often not effective anywhere until far into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries .
Third, 'economic liberalism' is not a correct characterization of the liberalism of Smith, Cobden, and Bright. It is a category that depoliticizes their views, and I doubt it is the effect of a serious engagement with their writings and speeches.
Excellent piece. Interesting that so many so-called classical liberals today revere Lord Acton, who supported the Confederacy and got every prediction wrong, and are silent on Bright. Ideology or ignorance, or both maybe.
Thank you!