If one pays attention to the flight of Hegelian owls, one might take the avalanche of works on the history of liberalism, alongside the political events of the last decade, as evidence that the age of liberalism has come to an end.
Have you treated Pocock's statement that by 1790 "A commercial humanism had been not unsuccessfully constructed"?
The point being, I am uncomfortable with, in reference to 18th-c liberalism, speaking of "liberalism's lowered sight." The sights of Smith's TMS are high, even quite explicitly so. The wise and virtuous man "directs his principal attention to" the higher standard. See pp. 247–48.
First, Manent treats Locke as the father of liberalism. And basically treats liberalism as embracing avoidance of summum malum and security.
Second, there is a complex question what the relationship between that account is and the kind of thing that Smith's wise and virtuous man strives for. I think Griswold and Hanley both don't like Cropsey's deflationary answer to this. But it is no simple matter. (I tackle it in the final chapter of my book.)
Third, like you I now reject manent's way of framing the origin and nature of the liberal tradition.
Both/and, as usual, with Smith: (1) As a political orientation, classical liberalism focuses on avoidance of summum malum, by hamstringing and hemming in the governmentalization of social affairs; thus, in Locke, the pro overall-liberty terms and conditions of the "contract", and the general opposition to governmentalization in Hume, Smith, and Burke, who well know that government is, by and large, a sham and a menace and that keeping it from wreaking evil is the polity's chief challenge. (2) As an ethical outlook, liberalism may still maintain the focus on virtue, with the individual directing his principal attention to the higher standard. Avoidance of summum malum in politics is subsumed within summum bonum in ethics. Thus, both/and.
Interesting post, thanks Eric.
Have you treated Pocock's statement that by 1790 "A commercial humanism had been not unsuccessfully constructed"?
The point being, I am uncomfortable with, in reference to 18th-c liberalism, speaking of "liberalism's lowered sight." The sights of Smith's TMS are high, even quite explicitly so. The wise and virtuous man "directs his principal attention to" the higher standard. See pp. 247–48.
A few interesting complications here.
First, Manent treats Locke as the father of liberalism. And basically treats liberalism as embracing avoidance of summum malum and security.
Second, there is a complex question what the relationship between that account is and the kind of thing that Smith's wise and virtuous man strives for. I think Griswold and Hanley both don't like Cropsey's deflationary answer to this. But it is no simple matter. (I tackle it in the final chapter of my book.)
Third, like you I now reject manent's way of framing the origin and nature of the liberal tradition.
Both/and, as usual, with Smith: (1) As a political orientation, classical liberalism focuses on avoidance of summum malum, by hamstringing and hemming in the governmentalization of social affairs; thus, in Locke, the pro overall-liberty terms and conditions of the "contract", and the general opposition to governmentalization in Hume, Smith, and Burke, who well know that government is, by and large, a sham and a menace and that keeping it from wreaking evil is the polity's chief challenge. (2) As an ethical outlook, liberalism may still maintain the focus on virtue, with the individual directing his principal attention to the higher standard. Avoidance of summum malum in politics is subsumed within summum bonum in ethics. Thus, both/and.