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An argument I've made about climate and "future generations" can be turned around here, I think. A lot of utilitarians think it's OK to discount the welfare of future generations (as distinct from giving their marginal consumption less weight because we expect them to be richer). But, future generations are already here - all going well, my grandchildren will be around to enjoy a stabilised climate in 2100. Discounting the future requires discounting the welfare of later born people who are currently alive. (This doesn't get you to the crazy version of longtermism because of uncertainty, and because it pushes against counting hypothetical people who might not be born).

Now turn this around. If liberalism involves compensating people for breaches of their rights in the present (more precisely the immediate past), and claims of this kind can legitimately be made by their children who suffer as result of their parents' deprivation, then there is no point at which the claims are extinguished, except when the harm ceases to be relevant to peoples lives.

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