On Polybius and democratic rule.

Regular readers will have noticed, I recently read the first six books of Polybius’ Histories in Robin Waterfield’s (2010) translation (Oxford World Classics). (That translation seemed excellent to me, but I didn’t do a careful study of it.) While that’s much more than the few bits of Book 6 on the mixed constitution I had studied before, that’s probably under 20% of the whole, and we lack quite a bit of material today. So any claim about Polybius’ larger argument needs to be qualified quite a bit.

Polybius is quite fond of large and small digressions and so you will not be surprised I see in him a kindred spirit. In fact, Book 6 is itself an explicit digression from Polybius’ larger historical narrative although rather important to his theoretical argument. The main point of Book 6 is to explain the role of the Roman constitution in Rome’s success in conquering the Mediterranean world (and adjoining lands). This is contextualized with a broader typology of (ideal typical) constitutions and a kind of causal account of constitutional change. The latter is explicitly indebted to Plato’s Republic, although explicitly simplifies it quite a bit.

Along the way in Book 6, Polybius argues that the mixed “system of government” (which combines elements from monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) is clearly “best.” (Waterfield, p. 272) Polybius’ argument for this is empirical and he appeals to the Greek experience of Sparta, and the wider recent history of Rome. He explicitly sets aside Plato’s Kallipolis because it has not been tried yet (6.47).

This is not to deny that Polybius finds serious defects in Sparta’s constitution. In particular, it is quite clear to Polybius that the (non-monetized) political economy of Sparta is incapable of supporting expansive and hegemonic politics outside a limited domain, while generating a political class quite eager for honour and dominance throughout Greece (6.49-50).

As should be clear from these remarks, in Book 6, Polybius is quite critical of democratic constitutions. For Polybius, ‘democracy’ is majority rule, although it’s pretty clear he means the majority of male citizens, excluding women, slaves, and foreign residents. (6.4) But ‘democracy’ is for him also something normative because it “retains the traditional values of piety toward the gods, care of parents, respect of elders, and obedience to the laws.” (6.4) And the reason why Polybius offers a normative account of democracy is that he wants to distinguish it from mob role. (In addition, through book 6 runs an anxiety about the rejection of the Gods, but about that some other time.) Below I return to this topic because there is a further complication.

The key passage is on the ship of state that itself is a homage to and a variant on Plato’s Republic (488-489a). I quote from Evelyn S. Shuckburgh’s easily available translation (with minor changes).

For though [the Athenian constitution] perhaps had more frequent interludes of excellence, yet its highest perfection was attained during the brilliant career of Themistocles; and having reached that point it quickly declined, owing to its essential instability. For the Athenian demos is always in the position of a ship without a commander. In such a ship, if fear of the enemy, or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be of one mind and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well; but if they recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no longer all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the voyage, and the other urging the steersman to bring the ship to anchor; some letting out the sheets, and others hauling them in, and ordering the sails to be furled,—their discord and quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on; and the position of affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged on the same voyage: and the result has often been that, after escaping the dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they wreck their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what has often happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after repelling, on various occasions, the greatest and most formidable dangers by the valour of its people and their leaders, there have been times when, in periods of secure tranquillity, it has gratuitously and recklessly encountered disaster. Therefore I need say no more about either it, or the Theban constitution: in both of which a mob manages everything on its own unfettered impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of violence and ferocity. (6.44)

Now, Polybius’ version of the ship of state passage has a far more anti-democratic sensibility than the version articulated by Socrates in the Republic. (I also suspect Polybius’ version has shaped how the Republic version is received.) In the Republic, it’s ambitious democratic elites (the sailors) that cause confusion about the skill needed to pilot the ship of state. And these same elites are the source of disharmony in a democracy.

In Polybius, the problem is that actually existing ‘democracies’ are always unpiloted and are de facto instances of mob rule. Because Athens is barely discussed in the Histories, Polybius actually does not explicitly argue the case except to imply that (of the criteria that he embraces in his normative conception of democracy) it lacks respect for the rule of law; for in embracing pure majority rule, Athenians embrace subjection to its whims. And in so doing it will be skillfully guided only by accident, that is, when there happen to be excellent leaders.

If we look at the passage Polybius identifies three problems in actually existing democracies: first they generally lack unity; they lack strategic foresight; they make sub-optimal decisions. Only when there is a common enemy or an urgent crisis do they rise to the occasion and exhibit energetic and purposeful shared purpose. It is difficult for us to evaluate this because even the most unitary democratic states with a unicameral parliament tend to hem it in with bureaucracy and a relatively independent legal system.

So, crucially, on Polybius account of majoritarian democracy (now broadly conceived), it is more in need of the art of government than other forms of government because its constitution does not internalize proper incentives for good leadership, nor has it properly codified the wisdom of the ages or historical experience. And all of this allows him to claim that when democracies flourish it is the effect of exceptionally good leadership.

Now, the highly negative view of unmixed democracies comes a bit out of the blue in the Histories because Book 2 gives a highly flattering account of the Achaean league (recall here; and here.) In fact, as David Hime notes, “The Achæans enjoyed the freest and most perfect democracy of all antiquity.” Polybius himself singles out the freedom to speak one’s mind in an assembly (parrhesia) and equality (2.38), and equates it with a true or perfection of democracy. And so this seems the highest form of democracy that can be instantiated (not the normative ideal). And he goes on to claim that it is the source of general prosperity amongst its members (2.38). And later, at the start of book 4, he treats federal ‘democracy’ as the most excellent form of political government (4.1).

What prevents the Achaean league from instantiating mob rule? It’s not the proto-Condorcet argument that if you increase size you converge on the truth. It’s also not merely the fact that allied democracies are necessarily wiser or unified than each alone.

As I noted before Madison and Hamilton worried about the question in Federalist Papers 18, and, while appealing to Mably’s argument, point to features of the federal structure that make it law-governed: “the [democratic] government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.” (Emphasis in original.)

On Madison and Hamilton’s account the Achaean league does not perform so well in dangerous crises, which induce “dissensions…among its members.” This is not necessarily incompatible with Polybius’ view (which is their ultimate source). For, the reason why Polybius praises Rome’s (unitary) mixed constitution, with its many economic cross entanglements (6.17 about that some other time more), is precisely that during crises it reinforces the tendency toward unity and prudential decision-making (6.43-56). But Polybius is equally clear that once Roman supremacy arrives it will be fundamentally unstable because it will generate the conditions for honour and power seeking political adventurers who will destroy it from within (6.57); Hobbes more than anyone takes up the challenge of offering a remedy to it.

So, to summarize, on Polybius’ view, mixed constitutions (like Sparta and Rome) do best during wartime with the Roman one most capable of supporting indefinite expansion. It is worth asking whether the popularity of Polybius among the founders means that the American founding was always oriented toward war. Or whether the emphasis on federalism means it was always meant to be more pacific in character.

To conclude, according to Polybius, democracies (in the ancient sense) work best either if they are part of a federal democratic structure (as the US is), where the federal structures generate moderation and status quo bias in the context of relatively tranquil times. During periods of turmoil democracies are best unfederated and left to their own devices if they can be led by exceptional figures which might rise to the top there. Of course, Polybius himself repeatedly emphasizes the instructive nature of his narrative, and so one may wonder whether he thought an art of government can be taught to would be democratic leaders, too.