When, back at NewAPPS, I first blogged about Susan Stebbing (1885 – 1943), a key figure in early analytic philosophy, there was almost no scholarship on her. Since then a fine entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy and a number of important scholarly papers and books have appeared. I take no credit for this joyous state of affairs!
Lately, I'm seeing (or, more likely, noticing) lots of versions of the idea that overconfidence is good for us. It's not new. Adam Smith said something along these lines, and mentioned lottery gambling as an example (that's in my field, so I've cited it a lot).
But is it true, and in what sense? Or is belief in the pragmatic value of overconfidence just a reflection of the same biases that give rise to overconfidence in the first place?
Lately, I'm seeing (or, more likely, noticing) lots of versions of the idea that overconfidence is good for us. It's not new. Adam Smith said something along these lines, and mentioned lottery gambling as an example (that's in my field, so I've cited it a lot).
But is it true, and in what sense? Or is belief in the pragmatic value of overconfidence just a reflection of the same biases that give rise to overconfidence in the first place?