On the End of Nato: a European perspective

Politics has returned to Europe’s wealthy protectorates, which, after the phone-call on Jan. 20, 2025, between the then-President-elect and the Danish prime minister, suddenly find themselves faced with an open-ended era of shakedowns by its guardians and an unreliable big neighbor to the East. Neither its political class nor its aging, nostalgic population is prepared for this.

Qua democratic politician, it’s one thing to have skill at facilitating distributional bargaining among competing and shifting interest groups; it’s quite another to do so while simultaneously having to think through geopolitical alliances with undermanned and underfunded militaries. Interestingly enough, with a shift toward new populist leaders Europe’s political class is also quite inexperienced in politics. It seems all but certain that during next month’s federal election, the most important European country and the only one that can provide political leadership, Germany, is itself facing a massive shift toward a political class inexperienced playing intra-European and global political chess at the same time.

It wasn’t supposed to be like this. Europeans have been behaving in defiance of Machiavellian classical social theory, which teaches that “The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws.” (The Prince, Ch. 12) More bluntly (and most unpopular): a regime oriented toward protecting human rights presuppose good arms, too. The Europeans assumed that in an age of soft-power, a giant internal market, and win-win international/trade rules, they didn’t need good arms and could perfect their laws—even extend those through intra-European/EU expansion.

As an aside, perhaps it would be more correct to say that the unfreezing of European politics has been in the air since the (failed) Russian assault on Antonov airport (the battle of Hostomel). But Europe has not used the time wisely since.

In fact, within Europe (and the European side of Nato) the Europeans have ceded political agency to Turkey which has been active trying to redraw the political map among its (Middle Eastern) neighbors not the least Syria. Turkey is only the seventh largest economy in Europe. After shutting the Turks out of any future EU expansion plans, it shouldn’t surprise that Turkey’s agency need not fit European priorities.

Be that as it may, at least the German election is timely. And while debates surrounding immigration are still quite salient, Germany’s election is also taking place at a time of a generational, structural economic crisis. Its mainstay, the car industry and its wider ecology of small businesses is imploding as it failed to participate in the transition to E-cars. In addition, Germany’s energy infrastructure is in awful shape (even its once famous trains are deplorable). And while Germany’s universities have clearly improved in my lifetime they are still lagging (even among European peers), while many of its most ambitious students still go abroad to better organized universities elsewhere.

Of course, the underlying problem is that many of Europe’s wealthiest protectorates still are unwilling to sort out whether they are being shaken off to be protected from Russia or — sotte voce — a resurgent Germany. And Germany’s population itself shares in this ambivalence about its role.

During the first Trump presidency the European mood was different. While few admired President Trump’s style, it was generally agreed that his bullying for more Nato spending, while clearly facilitating the US Arms’ industry, actually aided de facto the common good. And in many European capitals there was quiet relief they could assert (as they usually do with ‘dictates from Brussels’) that “Trump had forced their unwilling hands.”

The problem is that both the Cold-War Nato and the post-Cold-War Nato era are effectively finished. The mutual trust that characterized both came to an end last week. Now European governments are faced with the possibility of a never-ending list of demands for territory, preferential access, and preferential business deals in favor of Trump’s family or the favored oligarch(s) of the month. It’s one thing to have to deal with foreign oligarchs participating in local politics, it’s quite another if they themselves have the backing of the US military or a highly targeted US tarriff. (Latin Americans may take quiet satisfaction in this development, but shared misery does not make wise policy.) Either way, even if they can accommodate Trump, the process will only encourage local grifters, too.

That the NATO era is effectively finished can be made most transparent by the following thought: at the moment it seems most European polities and their politicians hope, if they allow themselves to think about it, to muddle through. And this is a viable policy only — and somewhat ironically this is the best they can hope for — when despite the current bluster, America will come to feel relatively weak in light of an ascendant China and so seek out a new structural partnership with Europe. Either way, there is no reason to expect Europe will be favored by fortune in this fashion.

The next Nato Summit is 24-25 June, 2025, at the Hague. The local debate is mostly about parking problems and regional mayors complaining that the security needs of the Summit are making it impossible to hold popular, annual summer festivals. At the moment nobody dares to suggest to cancel the Nato Summit altogether. When all the options are bad, muddling through has an enchanting charm. But ending the charade may generate the clarity required to begin to chart a new course. For history teaches that free, wealthy and undefended polities end up unfree.

To be continued…