By a ‘transition problem,’' I mean the challenge of how to move from an imperfect status quo to an ideal or vastly improved polity and, in particular, with a population raised under bad institutions (the status quo). There are (at least) three species of the transition problem: the first version turns on the challenge of finding or developing the right sort of people (with the right education or dispositions, etc.) to get us from here to there and then to have the skills and temperament to make the new circumstances work out well. The second version is to create mechanisms such that the incentives of policy-makers line up with the goals to be pursued and/or the true interests of people/constituents and how to get from here (under bad institutions) to there (the institutions with the right mechanisms). The third version is a collective action problem when a population raised under bad institutions may rationally prefer a bad status quo if getting to the better state involves high costs to them. Of course, in practice these three versions can be blended in various ways, and they themselves may be distinguished in further kinds.*
Socrates and the Transition problem.
Socrates and the Transition problem.
Socrates and the Transition problem.
By a ‘transition problem,’' I mean the challenge of how to move from an imperfect status quo to an ideal or vastly improved polity and, in particular, with a population raised under bad institutions (the status quo). There are (at least) three species of the transition problem: the first version turns on the challenge of finding or developing the right sort of people (with the right education or dispositions, etc.) to get us from here to there and then to have the skills and temperament to make the new circumstances work out well. The second version is to create mechanisms such that the incentives of policy-makers line up with the goals to be pursued and/or the true interests of people/constituents and how to get from here (under bad institutions) to there (the institutions with the right mechanisms). The third version is a collective action problem when a population raised under bad institutions may rationally prefer a bad status quo if getting to the better state involves high costs to them. Of course, in practice these three versions can be blended in various ways, and they themselves may be distinguished in further kinds.*